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The Right to Representation by Counsel in

University Disciplinary Proceedings: A
Denial of Due Process of Law

At this time when.., we proudly contrast the full hearings
before our courts with those in the benighted countries

which have no due process protection, when many of our

courts are so careful in the protection of those charged with
crimes that they will not permit the use of evidence illegally
obtained, our sense of justice should be outraged by denial
to students of the normal safeguards. It is shocking that the

officials of a state educational institution, which can
function properly only if our freedoms are preserved, should
not understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is
equally shocking to find that a court supports them in
denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket. 1
INTRODUCTION

One night in November of 1990, Thomas Osteen, a university student,
was involved in an altercation with two men.' During the course of the
altercation, Osteen intentionally caused severe bodily injury to the two men.'
In response to these events, Northern Illinois University (NIU) commenced
disciplinary proceedings against Osteen, alleging he had violated sections 31.1 (a) and 1-1.1 (b)4 of the NIU Student Judicial Code.5 Prior to his disciplin-

1. Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L REv. 1406,
1406-07 (1956-57).
2. Osteen v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities, No. 91 CV 20247, 1992 WL
74995 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 1992), affd, Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner,
J.). At the time of the incident Thomas Osteen was an undergraduate student at Northern
Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois. 13 F.3d at 221.
3. See Osteen, 13 F.3d at 223. The court, quoting one of the defendants, university
judicial officer Larry Bolles, states: "I'm told without one word, Mr. Osteen, not one word out
of his mouth he stomps this guy in the head with some cowboy boots. This is what the guy said,
he had on some cowboy boots and he stomped him." Id. Another student in the company of
the one who had just been battered approached Osteen, "who again without a word 'broke his
face with one punch."' Id.
4. Chapter III of the NIU Student Judicial Code provides in pertinent part: "The
following acts or omissions to act are violations of the Student JudicialCode." (Emphasis in
original). Section 3-1 of the Student Judicial Code, entitled Safety, states in pertinent part: "All
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ary hearing, Osteen met with the adjudicator, Larry Bolles, for a conference

similar to a pre-trial settlement conference where, pursuant to advice he
received from the adjudicator, Osteen waived his right to a hearing and was
subsequently expelled from NIU. 6 During this informal meeting, the
adjudicator also advised Osteen that counsel would not be allowed to
participate in the disciplinary proceedings. 7 Osteen then appealed the
expulsion, which was ultimately upheld by the Judicial Appeals Board.' After
the appeals board affirmed the expulsion, Osteen filed a complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 9 alleging, inter alia, that his due process rights were
members of the university community are entitled to freedom from suffering deliberate hurt,
injury or loss. Access to the University must be available to all in a nonhostile and
nonthreatening atmosphere." Section 3-1.1(a) defines 'Physical Abuse' as: "Assaulting,
battering, or recklessly endangering any person." NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, Student

Judicial Code 6 (1996) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE].

5. Osteen, 1992 WL74995, at *1.
6. Id. According to the procedures established by the Student Judicial Code, prior to
the hearing the adjudicator "meets with the alleged offender and affords the offender an
opportunity to settle the case without a full hearing ....
" Larry Bolles was the adjudicator who
met with Osteen. "Bolles allegedly also advised plaintiff [Osteen] to plead guilty, receive a
sanction of expulsion, appeal that sanction, and that sanction would be reduced on appeal." Id.
7. Id. Under Section 2-7 of the NIU Student Judicial Code, "[a]n alleged offender may
be accompanied by an advocate or an attorney during all phases of the University judicial
proceedings; ...[however] [a]ttorneys will not be allowed to address the University Judicial
Boards or officers, but will be allowed to serve in an advisory capacity." JUDICIAL CODE, supra
note 4, at 5.
8. Osteen, 1992 WL 74995, at *2. During the appeal, Osteen did not retain counsel
but was represented by a student advocate who, as opposed to a licensed attorney, may address
the judicial officers and the board. Id. It is also interesting to note that during the appeals
phase, Bolles, who had acted as adjudicator in the original disciplinary proceeding, served as
the presenter. Id. "Under the Code, a presenter is the individual who presents the case to the
hearing board on behalf of the university." l As a result of this multiple hat role, Bolles, after
having decided what sanction to impose, counseling the student to accept the sentence and
having it reduced on appeal, argued to the Judicial Appeals Board that the sentence should be
upheld. Id. Osteen challenged this procedure in his suit against the University, however that
specific issue and the implications it has on due process is not addressed in this comment. In
short, courts have upheld the practice to a limited extent. See, e.g., Gorman v. University of
R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that various roles of administrators, while
inappropriate in a judicial setting, do not necessarily violate the requirements of fairness, nor
do they indicate bias).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
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violated when he was denied the right to be represented by counsel at the
disciplinary hearings.'"
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a lower court decision that Osteen's due process rights were not
violated when he was denied the opportunity to be represented by counsel."
The Seventh Circuit held that a university student is not deprived of the

procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause when a university
does not allow the student to be represented by counsel in a disciplinary

proceeding.'" This opinion was in accord with numerous other decisions that

have answered the same question as presented in Osteen. 3 However, due to
the nature of the interest at stake and the risk of erroneously preventing a

student from receiving a college education by expelling him, this comment

argues that the cases supporting Osteen should be reconsidered. 4
The line of cases holding that university students involved in disciplinary
proceedings 5 do not have a due process right to representation by counsel

be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
10. Osteen, 1992 WL 74995, at *1.
11. Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993), affig, Osteen, 1992 WL 74995.
12. Osteen, 13 F.3d at 226. In this comment, the right to counsel must be distinguished
from the right to representation by counsel. Universities do not infringe on the student's right
to counsel because, under the Due Process Clause, students only have the right to be advised
by counsel during the course of the proceedings. In contrast however, for purposes of this
comment, the right to representation by counsel refers to the right of the student to retain a
licensed attorney to advocate the student's side of the argument to the university judicial boards.
This distinction is based on the distinction used by Douglas R. Richmond, Students' Right to
Counsel in University DisciplinaryProceedings,15 J.C. & U.L. 289 n.6 (1988-89).

13. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that
because of pending criminal case, a university student has a right to have a lawyer consult with
and advise him during the disciplinary proceeding but the lawyer may not further participate in
the hearing); Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (holding that a student does not have a constitutional right to representation by counsel
because proceedings in the case against the student were not unduly complex and university did
not proceed against student through an attorney); Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16
(1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the "weight of authority is against representation by counsel at
disciplinary hearings, unless student is also facing criminal charges"); Walter Saurack, Note,
Protectingthe Student: A Critique of the ProceduralProtectionAfforded to American and
English Students in University DisciplinaryProceedings,21 J.C. & U.L. 785 (1994-95).

14. Other commentators have similarly called for a reexamination of this area of the
law. See generally Richmond, supra note 12; Saurack, supra note 13; James M. Picozzi, Note,
University DisciplinaryProcess: What's Fair,What's Due, And What You Don't Get, 96 YALE

L.J. 2132 (1987).
15. For purposes of this article, disciplinary proceedings must be distinguished from
academic dismissal proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings seek to address conduct on the part
of the student that is either criminal in nature or amounts to a common law tort. In contrast,
academic dismissal proceedings seek to determine whether a student has met the academic
criteria necessary for graduation. Indeed, courts have historically drawn a line between
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should be reexamined because of the vital importance of education to our

society.' 6 As noted by James Picozzi, "[u]niversities perform the vital

function of teaching the 'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of

a democratic political system.""' 7 Moreover, a university degree is generally
required for employment in technologically sophisticated fields and students
with university degrees often receive higher salaries than students who do not
hold university degrees.'" Students facing disciplinary suspension or
expulsion should be accorded the right to representation by counsel as an
element of due process because of the vital role which education plays in
molding responsible citizens of a democratic government and because an
erroneous suspension or expulsion may foreclose future employment

opportunities for the students.

This comment argues that students attending public universities who are

involved in disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to retain counsel at

their own expense and have that counsel represent them before the judicial
board.' 9 Part I examines the instances in which the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are required by
determining when a liberty or property interest has been implicated and the
amount of process that is due. Part II examines the necessity of procedural
due process protections for university students involved in disciplinary
disciplinary proceedings and proceedings dealing with academic matters. Lisa L. Swem, Note,
Due ProcessRights in Student DisciplinaryMatters, 14 J.C. & U.L. 359, 361 n. 14 (1987-88).

See also Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2134 n.15. Picozzi states:
The Supreme Court distinguishes between academic and disciplinary
dismissals, deferring in the former case to the professional judgment of
educators. Justice Rehnquist explained:
Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a
student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for

academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information

Id.

and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). Consequently, the Court ruled that it
would not require as much procedure in the case of academic dismissal
as it would in cases of disciplinary dismissal. Id. at 86. Recently, in
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1985), the
Court reaffirmed that distinction.

16. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that
education is the "very foundation of good citizenship").
17. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2132 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77
(1979)).

18. Saurack, supra note 13, at 785 n.5.

19. This comment does not address the due process rights of students in private
universities involved in disciplinary proceedings. For reference to cases dealing with the due
process rights of students in private universities, see Swem, supra note 15, at 359 n.2.
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proceedings because of the liberty and property interests a student holds in a
college degree. Part HI explores the present scope of a university student's
right to counsel as currently required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Part IV reexamines the student's right to
representation by counsel by arguing that the test used to determine how much
process is due balances in favor of the student rather than the university.
I.

WHEN PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ARE
REQUIRED

According to the Due Process Clause, no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ... ."20 Obviously, as
a university may not deprive a student of life, a student must show that a
liberty or property interest has been infringed by state action in order to
invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause."' In determining
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, courts must look to
the nature of the interest at stake." The student must show that state action
deprives him of some interest that the Supreme Court has held to be encompassed within the terms "liberty" or "property." 3 While the Court has not
rigidly defined these terms, it has observed certain boundaries in order to give
meaning to them.24 After a court determines that an interest falls within the
scope of liberty or property protected by the Due Process Clause, a court must
then determine how much process is due.2"
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569 (1972) (holding that
a person is only guaranteed the requirements of procedural due process when deprived of an
interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty or property).
22. Id. at 571 ("We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth
20.
21.

Amendment's protection of liberty and property.").

23. With regard to the broad scope of the terms "liberty" and "property" and the
interests encompassed by the terms, the Court in Roth stated:
'Liberty' and 'property' are broad and majestic terms. They are among
the '[g]reat [constitutional] concepts... purposely left to gather meaning
from experience .... [T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and
economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well

that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.'
Id. (citing National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Franfurter, J., dissenting)).
24. Id. at 572.
25. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what
process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others as not
to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands ....

To

say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that judges
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A. DETERMINING WHETHER A LIBERTY OR PROPERTY INTEREST HAS BEEN
INFRINGED BY STATE ACTION

1. The Meaning of "Liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."2 While the Supreme Court has
refused to define the term "liberty" with any precision, it has considered some
instances in which an interest is definitely encompassed within the meaning
of the term.' Some of the interests that are held to be liberty interests which
may not be deprived without due process of law include:
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 8
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the procedural protections of the
Due Process Clause are implicated in situations where a person is deprived of
a liberty interest different in kind from that which is commonly imposed by
the criminal process.29
Guiding principles in elucidating the broad scope of liberty interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause were

Id.

are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its
scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a
recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call
for the same kind of procedure.

26. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
("Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision, that term is
not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range
of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective.")).
27. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
28. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (emphasis added).
29. Id. See also Boiling, 374 U.S. at 499 (defining the term liberty in terms broader
than mere freedom from bodily restraint).
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enunciated in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.° There the United States Supreme
Court stated that liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause are
implicated "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him.. . ,"' The Court
noted that when state government officials, pursuant to a state act, posted the
names of persons deemed to be excessive drinkers in retail liquor outlets and
prohibited liquor sales to such persons, the liberty interests of those persons
were implicated. 2 The Court further expressed that it was essential to provide
those affected by the statute with notice and an opportunity to be heard
because they were summarily deprived of a liberty interest protected under the
Due Process Clause.33 Thus, because Constantineau's legal status was altered
to the extent that he had lost his right to purchase liquor,' the Court reasoned
that "[t]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss
of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a
After
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society."35
Constantineau,whenever the state acted to impair the good name, reputation
or honor of a person by placing a stigma on him without an opportunity to be
heard, the state infringed upon a liberty interest of the citizen and violated his
due process rights.36
However, in Paul v. Davis,37 Davis, a photographer for a local newspaper, had his picture and name distributed to local business establishments in
a flyer produced by police agencies warning the businesses that the persons
named therein were known to be active shoplifters.3" Davis challenged this
procedure claiming that he was deprived of a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause because his reputation was damaged.39 The U.S. Supreme
Court, distinguishing this case from Constantineau, held that not every
impairment of a person's reputation by state action infringes upon liberty

30. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
31. Id. at 437; Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137; Saurack, supra note 13, at 788.
32. Constantineau,400 U.S. at 436-37.
33. Id.
34. Saurack, supra note 13, at 788.
35. Constantineau,400 U.S. at 437 (citing Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
36. See id.
37. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
38. Id. at 695-96.
39. Id. at 697. At the time the flyer was distributed, Davis had been arrested for
shoplifting in June, 1971. Id. at 695. Davis was arraigned, charged and entered a plea of not
guilty. Id. The charge was subsequently "filed away with leave [to reinstate] ..... Id. at 696.
This disposition left the charge outstanding. When the flyer was distributed Davis had been
charged but a determination as to his guilt or innocence had not been reached. Id.
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interests which would require the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause.' The Court stated that the holdings in previous cases where a liberty
interest was held to have been deprived without due process of law4 rested on
the fact that the right claimed to have been deprived by state action was a right
the individual previously held under state law.42 After the Paul ruling,
infringements upon liberty interests by the state are only entitled to procedural
due process protections if "the governmental action taken... deprive[s] the
individual of a right previously held under state law. . . ."' As noted by
Picozzi, "stigma must be accompanied by the deprivation of a right previously
held under state law, or result in some other alteration of legal status .... 44
Since state law did not extend any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of
reputation to Davis, the Court held that the distribution of the flyer did not
deprive him of a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause.4 s
These cases demonstrate that the scope of liberty interests protected by
the Due Process Clause involve instances in which the status of a person's
name, reputation, honor, or integrity previously protected by state law is in

40. Id. at 711-12; Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137-38.
41. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that once state issues
driver's license the continued possession of the license is a protected liberty interest which may
not be deprived without due process of law); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-83
(holding that because state allowed persons on parole significant liberty to do as they wished
so long as they did not violate the conditions of their parole, the state must provide some
informal, orderly process in terminating the parole of a parolee).
42. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12; Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137; Saurack, supra note 13,
at 788.
43. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708.
44. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137.
45. Paul,424 U.S. at 711. The Court in Paul states:
[Tihe interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in
this action in federal court is quite different from the 'liberty' or
'property' recognized in those decisions [referring to Constantineau,Bell
and Morrissey]. Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal
guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as
a result of petitioners' actions. Rather, his interest in reputation is simply
one of a number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of
its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interests by means
of damages actions. And any harm or injury to that interest, even where
as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation
of any 'liberty' or 'property' recognized by state or federal law, nor has
it worked any change of respondent's legal status as theretofore
recognized under the State's laws. For these reasons we hold that the
interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty' nor
'property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of
law.
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some way altered.46 For students to invoke the procedural protections of the
Due Process Clause in university disciplinary proceedings, they must
demonstrate either that they previously had a right to an education protected
by state law or that their legal status is in some way altered when a university
seeks to impose disciplinary sanctions upon them.4 7
2. The Meaning of "Property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
In comparison to the term liberty, the term "property" as contained in the
Due Process Clause has been similarly defined in a broad sense.4" Moreover,
the term "property" in the Due Process Clause is not limited in definition to
the common law concept of the term. 9 Indeed, property interests may take
many forms.50 The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural
protection of property is to "safeguard ...the security of interests that a
person has already acquired in specific benefits."'" However, the extent to
which a person has an interest in specific benefits is not unlimited, and the
Supreme Court has delineated in broad terms what may properly constitute a
protected property interest.52
It is clear from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Due
Process Clause does not create property interests, but rather protects citizens
from erroneous deprivation of property interests by state action without due
process of law.53 The creation and delineation of property interests, and the
extent to which they are protected, are elucidated from "existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of

46. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Part II (examining court decisions addressing whether a student holds a
liberty or property interest in education).
48. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (stating that
"'Liberty' and 'property' are broad and majestic terms.").
49. See id. at 571-72. "The Court has also made clear that the property interests
protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels,
or money." Id.
50. See id. at 572, 577. For examples of property which the Supreme Court has held
to be protected by the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(continued receipt of welfare benefits); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
(employment held under tenure provisions); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
(employment held under contract provisions).
51. Roth, 404 U.S. at 576.
52. See id. at 577.
53. See id. See also Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2136.
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entitlement to those benefits." 4 Thus, "[t]o have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it
....He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.""5
In order for a student involved in university disciplinary proceedings to
invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, the student must
demonstrate that there is a basis for legitimate reliance on state laws or rules
to create a property interest in his education.56 This is because "[i]t is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined."57 Once a basis for legitimate reliance is demonstrated, the
property interest that a student has in his education would trigger the
procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.5" Thus, the
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would apply to university
disciplinary proceedings because "[i]t is a purpose of the constitutional right
to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate [his property]
59
claims."
B.

DETERMINING HOW MUCH PROCESS IS DUE

Once it has been demonstrated that a liberty or property interest is
subject to deprivation as a result of state action, the second step is to
determine how much process is due.' While, at a minimum, due process
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard6 when the state seeks to
permanently deprive a person of a protected interest, additional procedural
protections may be required depending on the particular situation. 62 In
determining how much process is due in a proceeding where the state seeks
to deprive someone of a protected interest, courts typically use the test
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge.63 This test requires courts to balance the
individual's interests against the government's interest to ascertain the amount
54. Roth, 404 U.S. at 577. In the same paragraph the Court explains that the welfare
recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 50, had a right to an eligibility hearing for welfare
benefits because a property right to such benefits was created by a state statute which defined
the eligibility criteria for such benefits. Id.
55. Id.
56. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2136-37.
57. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

59.

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

60. See supra note 25 (noting that due process is a flexible concept).
61. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
62. Id. at 334 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972) ("[D]ue process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands.")).
63. See id. at 334-35.
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of process that is constitutionally required.' In Mathews, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that the following factors must be balanced when determining the
amount of process necessary in a specific proceeding:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.65
Under this rationale, a student in a university disciplinary proceeding
must demonstrate that his interests outweigh those of the university. The
student must establish that there is an important interest at stake, namely an
education." Further, the student must demonstrate that without the right to
representation by counsel there is a large risk that he will be erroneously
deprived of a protected interest in his education. Finally, the student must
show that these procedures would substantially outweigh the burdens that they
would place on the effective administration of the university.67 It would then
be the responsibility of the court to determine whether or not the Due Process
Clause requires additional procedural safeguards for the benefit of the student.
II.

A STUDENT'S LIBERTY OR PROPERTY INTEREST IN A COLLEGE EDUCATION: THE NECESSITY OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against [deprivations of rights by] the State itself and all of its
Since public universities are created by state constitutions
creatures . ,,6.
or statutes and are funded by state taxes, they are thus creatures of the state.69
64.
65.
66.
foundation
67.

Id.; Saurack, supra note 13, at 789.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See supra note 16 (noting that the Brown decision recognized education as the
of democratic society).
See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 789 n.37 (listing some burdens to invoking

trial procedures in a university disciplinary proceeding).
J.).

68.

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (Jackson,

69. See, e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that three
Illinois state universities are governed by separate state statutes); Garshman v. Pennsylvania
State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 913 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (finding of fact that management and
operation of university was placed in hands of Board of Trustees pursuant to 1885 legislative
act); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
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As such they must provide students with the procedural protections required
by the Due Process Clause if their actions implicate a liberty or property
interest of the student.7'
A.

THE STUDENT'S LIBERTY INTEREST IN A COLLEGE EDUCATION

1. Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has yet to specifically hold that

university students attending public institutions of higher education have

protected liberty interests in their educations." In Boardof Curatorsof the

Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,72 a medical student was dismissed from a state-

supported medical school for failing to meet academic standards." The
student brought a § 1983 action74 claiming that she was denied procedural due

process when dismissed from the medical program.75 In order to invoke the

procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, Horowitz claimed that
her dismissal from the medical school deprived her of a liberty interest

(holding that the University of California, Berkeley, is a department or function of the state
government pursuant to Article IX, section 9, of state constitution).
70. See discussion supra Part I.B.
71. Saurack, supra note 13, at 790. See also Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
72. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
73. Id. at 79. Note that this case revolved around an academic, not disciplinary,
dismissal proceeding. The Supreme Court has not reviewed disciplinary dismissal proceedings
in state universities.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See supra note 9 for the text of the statute.
75. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80. Horowitz, the medical student, was dismissed from the
program because of poor clinical performance. In her first year of medical study, faculty
members were dissatisfied with her performance in "clinical patient-oriented settings" and with
her attendance. Horowitz was then advanced to her second year on a probationary basis.
During the second year, Horowitz's faculty advisor rated her clinical performance
"unsatisfactory." Thereupon it was decided by the Council on Evaluation, a committee
which
is entrusted with reviewing a student's academic performance and at which the student is not
allowed to appear before during the Council's review of academic performance, that Horowitz
should not be permitted to graduate at the end of the term. Further, it was determined that
absent "radical improvement" Horowitz should be dropped from the school. Horowitz then
"appealed" this decision by taking a series of oral and practical examinations with seven
practicing physicians. Two of these physicians recommended that she be dropped from the
program, three recommended that she not be allowed to graduate, and two recommended that
she graduate on schedule. With these recommendations, the Council affirmed its prior decision.
Near the end of the term it was decided that Horowitz would not be permitted to re-enroll in the
medical program. This decision was approved by the Coordinating Committee, the Dean of the
Medical School, and the University's Provost for Health Sciences. Id. at 80-82.
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76
protected by the Due Process Clause. Horowitz argued that her dismissal
would substantially impair her opportunity to continue her medical education
in another medical program and to pursue a career in a field related to the
practice of medicine." The Court, however, did not specifically rule on
Horowitz's argument that a liberty interest was implicated in the decision to
7
dismiss Horowitz from the medical program. " Instead, the Supreme Court
assumed the existence of a liberty interest and held that Horowitz was
afforded all the process she was due by allowing her to be examined by seven
physicians in order to certify that the Council on Evaluation's determination
that she be dismissed was correct.79 Given that this was an academic dismissal
proceeding, the Court also was reluctant to impose judicial fact-finding
procedures on the university. 0
While the Court has not considered whether a liberty interest of a college
student is implicated in university disciplinary proceedings, it has considered
whether liberty interests of high school students are implicated when these
2
8
students are suspended or expelled from school. " In Goss v. Lopez,1 nine
students were suspended from an Ohio high school for periods of up to ten
8 3 The
days without being afforded a hearing on the alleged misconduct.
4
students brought suit under § 1983, claiming that this procedure denied them
5 The Court held that these students had liberty interests
due process of law.
in their educations which could not be denied without affording them
procedural due process.8 6 The Court further held that the liberty interests of
these students were implicated because the suspensions for misconduct could
87
impair the students' reputations with their fellow classmates and teachers.
Additionally, the Court found that these charges could also impair these
8 Thus,
students' opportunities to pursue college educations or careers.
because the actions of the school in suspending the students implicated a

76. Id. at 82. Horowitz did not claim that she was deprived of a property interest. Id.
77. Id.

78.
79.

Id. at 84.
Id. at 84-85.

83.

Id. at 568.

80. See supra note 15 (noting the Court's reluctance to intrude into academic dismissal
proceedings).
81. In contrast to university students, public high school students often have a
statutorily guaranteed right to receive an education. Saurack, supra note 13, at 790 n.44.
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See supra note 9 for the text of the statute.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 574-75; Saurack, supra note 13, at 790.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 575; Saurack, supra note 13, at 790.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
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protected liberty interest, the students were entitled to certain procedures as
required by the Due Process Clause. 9
The distinction between Horowitz" and Goss9 seems to suggest that
while the Supreme Court will specifically find that high school students have
liberty interests in their educations,' the Court will only assume, for purposes

of argument, that university students hold protected liberty interests in their
collegiate educations.9"

Because high school students have statutorily

conferred rights to receive a free public education, it is easier for the Court to
find that a protected liberty interest exists in instances in which high school
students are involved.9" In contrast, university students have no statutorily

conferred right to an education which may explain why the Court merely

assumes arguendo that a protected liberty interest exists in cases in which
university students are involved." Thus, because liberty interests are only
implicated where a person is stigmatized by the deprivation of a right
previously held under state law, 96 the Court may be unwilling to reach the
question of whether university students possess a specific liberty interest in
their educations. 97
89. "It is apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and
without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the
requirements of the Constitution." Id.
90. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic
dismissal of student enrolled in state medical college).
91. 419 U.S. 565 (disciplinary dismissal of high school student).
92. Id.
93. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78.
94. See supra note 81 (noting that public high school students often have a statutory
right to an education).
95. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84-85.
96. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). See also supra note 41 and discussion
Part I.A. 1.
97. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Justice Brandeis states:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Id. (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909)). The application of
the Ashwander doctrine to cases involving questions of whether a university student holds a
specific liberty interest in a college education may relieve the Court of having to decide this
question. As stated in Part I.B, due process is a flexible concept which, at a minimum, requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). It has been
held that due process only requires that students involved in disciplinary proceedings be given some
type of notice and some type of opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
581-85 (1975) (high school students); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59
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However, the distinction between Horowitz and Goss may only be
tenable to the degree that Horowitz involved an academic dismissal, while
Goss involved a disciplinary dismissal.98 Disciplinary dismissals, in contrast
(5th Cir. 1961) (college student), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (1967) (college students); Jones v. Northern Ill. Univ., Nos. 95 C
50162 to 95 C 50164 and 95 C 50174, 1996 WL 19453, *3 (N.D. 11. Jan. 2, 1996) (college
student); discussion infra Part III. In the context of academic dismissal proceedings, the procedural
requirements of due process are even less formal. CompareHorowitz, 435 U.S. at 86 (holding that
difference between academic dismissal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings calls for less
stringent procedural requirements in instances involving academic dismissal), with Goss, 419 U.S.
at 581-82 (in disciplinary context, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard).
Therefore, if a state university affords a student some type of notice and some sort of opportunity
to be heard, regardless of whether it is an academic or disciplinary proceeding, the state will have
complied with the requirements of due process. In Horowitz then, when the medical school notified
the student of her academic deficiency and gave her an opportunity to appeal by being evaluated
by seven physicians, the medical school afforded the student more procedural due process than
required by the Due Process Clause. 435 U.S. at 85 (agreeing with the District Court's
determination that the school gave Horowitz more procedure than she was due). Thus, under the
Ashwander doctrine, if the procedural requirements of due process have been met by the state when
it seeks to suspend or expel a student, the Court need not address the question of whether a liberty
interest is implicated. Although the undecided question of whether a university student has a
protected liberty interest in his education is properly presented and is a necessary precedent to
invoking the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, the Court can dispose of the case
on the ground that the student was afforded all the process he was due. The scope of the procedural
due process requirements, having already been decided by the Court and satisfied by the State, the
Court need not decide the precedent question of whether a liberty interest is implicated because the
case can be decided on the ground that the student was afforded all the process that was
constitutionally required. In this instance then, the Ashwander doctrine operates to save the Court
from having to decide the undecided constitutional question of whether there is a protected liberty
interest because it can dispose of the case on an already decided constitutional ground, namely that
the requirements of procedural due process, having already been decided by the Court, have been
satisfied by the State.
98. The argument that these cases might also be distinguished on the ground that Goss
had a statutorily conferred and guaranteed right to a free public education while Horowitz had
no such statutorily conferred right overlooks the fact that public universities are created by state
statute or state constitutions. See supra note 69. By constitutional execution or legislative
enactment, state universities are created for the purpose of educating the citizens of the state
who fulfill the requirements for admittance to the university. If state universities are not created
for this purpose, then there would be no need to have state universities at all. While a student
must fulfill certain conditions in order to be accepted to a state created university, once accepted
and enrolled, the student holds an implied right under the state law creating the university to
attend such university. While there may be no explicit right to attend a university as there is
with grade school and high school, a student could argue that once accepted and enrolled in the
university he holds a right under state law to attend such university. This right that the student
holds flows from the statute creating such university. Because the right of the university to exist
is created by the operation of state law for the purpose of educating the citizens, the student has
a right to attend the university if he can meet the academic requirements of admission and the
university continues to exist as a result of legislative enactment. Indeed, without students who
had a right to attend the university, there would be no need for universities at all. See discussion
infra Part lI.B (exploring the property rights that students hold in receiving their educations).
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to academic dismissals, impose an acute stigmatizing effect on individuals

which, when combined with the deprivation of a right previously held under
state law,99 implicate sufficient liberty interests which the Court may be
willing to expressly recognize given the proper case."° This is so because

"[e]xpulsion is the 'capital punishment' of university discipline.''. Expulsion
from a university significantly alters the student's legal status as a result of

what the government is doing to him.'02 When a student is expelled, he is
often unable to enroll in a different university. 3 This is because a subsequent

university will always be aware of the circumstances surrounding a student's

previous dismissal."° If the student attempts to transfer to another university,
Thus, if a student is deprived of a property right previously held under state law when expelled
from a university due to misconduct, stigma is accompanied by a deprivation of that property
right previously held whereby liberty interests are now implicated. Paul, 424 U.S. at 710
(stigma of student's suspension in Goss accompanied by deprivation of previously held property
right to attend school implicates student's liberty interest); Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137.
Moreover, the dichotomy between characterizing an activity such as attending institutions of
higher education as a privilege, rather than a right, is no longer recognized in law. See generally
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (recognizing that "this Court now has rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or a 'privilege."'); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972) (stating "the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights'
and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights").
99. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12. See also supra note 41 (listing cases where the
deprivation of rights previously held under state law implicated liberty interests).
100. Compare Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (holding explicitly that a liberty interest is implicated
in disciplinary proceeding because students' reputations may be impaired and future
employment prospects may be adversely affected), with Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (assuming the
implication of medical student's liberty interest in academic dismissal proceeding even though
future employment prospects are definitely affected). Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to
judicially intrude upon academic dismissal proceedings, the Court may be willing to explicitly
hold that a university student does have a protected liberty interest in the context of a
disciplinary proceeding. See generally supra note 15 (discussing the Court's rationale for not
intruding on academic dismissal proceedings). However, a university disciplinary case has yet
to reach the Supreme Court. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
101. Herman v. University of S.C., 457 F.2d 902, 903 (4th Cir. 1972).
102. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2138.
103. Id.; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961)
(noting that it is unlikely that a public college would accept a student who had been expelled
from another public university of the same state); Goss, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (high school
students' opportunities to receive higher education may be impaired by sustaining charges of
misconduct). But see Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221,223 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that after being
expelled from NIU, Osteen enrolled at another college).
104. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2138. See also id. at 2138 n.38 (citing American
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, A Guide to An Adequate
Permanent Record and Transcript 11 (1971) (noting that there are three reasons why a student
leaves an institution before receiving a degree, namely personal, academic, or disciplinary)).
If a student transfers to another institution he will have to show which of these reasons caused
him to leave the previous institution. Id.
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the student must demonstrate to this new university that he left his previous
university in "good standing."' 5 When a student is expelled from a university
for disciplinary reasons, his liberty interests are infringed because he may
never again qualify as a candidate for a degree at another university."
Additionally, expulsion from a university alters a student's legal status by
inflicting an economic wound on the student which he carries with him for the
rest of his life.0 7 Given these alterations of a student's legal status, namely
the denial of the ability to enroll at another university and the economic
impact that the student feels as a result of his expulsion, it is clear that a
student is stigmatized as a result of what the government is doing to him, and
Thus, when
therefore, under Paul, his liberty interests are implicated.'
presented with a case involving the disciplinary dismissal of a student from a

public university, the Supreme Court may explicitly hold that university
students have protected liberty interests in their educations."

105. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2138; id. at 2138 n.40. Often, the student must produce
a letter of good standing from his previous university. Even if the transfer university does not
require such a letter, the transfer university will almost invariably find out about a student's
prior disciplinary problems. See id. While a student's suspension or expulsion from a
university is no longer an "essential" item of the student's transcript, many universities continue
to list any academic or disciplinary problems a student has on his transcript. Id. See also
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157 (stating that public college is unlikely to accept a student expelled from
a previous university).
106. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2139.
107. Id. The 1980 census statistics demonstrate that those with college degrees earn
more than those who do not hold such degrees. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2139 n.41 (citing
United States Bureau of the Census, Earnings by Occupation and Education, Series PC80-28B,
1 (May 1984)). See also Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75 (noting that high school students'
employment opportunities may be interfered with if charges of misconduct are sustained).
108. See Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137-40.
109. CompareBoard of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84-85
(assuming, rather than explicitly holding, that a medical student has a liberty interest in her
education), with Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75 (holding high school students involved in
disciplinary context have a liberty interest in their educations). Because the educational and
occupational opportunities of university students are substantially interfered with by charges of
misconduct in much the same way as the opportunities of the high school students in Goss were
interfered with, there appears to be no reason why the Court would not hold that university
students hold a protected liberty interest in their educations when involved in disciplinary
proceedings.
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2. Lower FederalCourtDecisions
In the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.," ° several
students were expelled from a state-supported university without being given
a specific notice of the charges against them or receiving an opportunity to
refute the charges."' In holding that the Due Process Clause required that the
students receive specific notice of the charges against them and an opportunity
to receive some type of hearing," 2 the Fifth Circuit stated that "the right to
remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing is
an interest of extremely great value."" 3 The Fifth Circuit noted that education
is vital to society and that without an education these plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood." 4 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit also
noted that it would be unlikely that these plaintiffs would be accepted at
another public college because of their expulsion from their present college.' 15
While the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly use the term "liberty interest," it is
clear from the court's language that the liberty interests of these students were
implicated," 6 and therefore, the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause must apply.'

110. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). Dixon is often referred to as the landmark case in the
area of delineating the procedural requirements mandated by the Due Process Clause for
students involved in disciplinary proceedings at public universities. See Saurack, supra note
13, at 793 (noting that Dixon is the first American case to recognize a college student's right to
the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause).
11.
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151-55 (noting that the students never received a definite
statement of the reasons why they were expelled and were not afforded an opportunity to be
heard). In Dixon, the students were expelled because of their actions relating to their protest of
policies regarding the segregation of African-Americans. Id. at 152 n.3.
112. Id. at 158-59.
113. Id. at 157.
114. Id. "Ihe precise nature of the private interest involved in this case is the right to
remain at a public institution of higher learning .... It requires no argument to demonstrate
that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society." Id.
115. Id. at 157.
116. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (stating
liberty interests which may not be deprived without due process of law include the right to
acquire useful knowledge and to engage in the common occupations of life).
117. The precise requirements of the Due Process Clause in university disciplinary
proceedings is addressed later in this article. See discussion infra Part 11. The assertion that
the Fifth Circuit found the interests involved in Dixon to be liberty interests is buttressed by the
fact that the Fifth Circuit proceeded to determine how much process these students were due.
Before the question of how much process is due can be answered, it must first be determined
whether a state's actions deprive a person of a protected interest encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Roth, 408 U.S. at 569 (stating that
the procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause apply only to the deprivations
of life, liberty or property); discussion supra Part I.
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In light of the decisions in Goss and Dixon, a number of federal circuit
and district courts have explicitly held that university students' liberty
interests are implicated in university disciplinary proceedings. In Crook v.
Baker,"8 the district court held that since the student had a protected property
interest in a master's degree which had previously been conferred,119 when the
university sought to rescind the degree based on allegations that Crook
fabricated his data, a liberty interest of the student was implicated under the
Paulanalysis."n On appeal, the University of Michigan did not challenge the
district court's holding that Crook held a liberty interest in his degree and
therefore the circuit court did not overturn this aspect of the decision12 In
Gorman v. University of R.L," the court held that the liberty interest of a
student was implicated when he faced a disciplinary suspension from a state
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the determination that the
university.
university student's liberty interests were implicated when faced with a

suspension from a public university." Moreover, a number of federal district

118. 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated on othergrounds, 813 F.2d 88 (6th
Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit vacated the decision on the ground that the District Court required
the student to be given more procedural protection than required under the Due Process Clause.
Crook, 813 F.2d at 97-101.
119. See infra note 175.
120. Crook, 584 F. Supp. at 1554-55 (holding that allegations that student fabricated data
and was thus a liar, cheat and thief, constitute sufficient deprivation of student's liberty
interests). First, the District Court found that these allegations would defame the student. Id.
Then, applying the requirements of Paul, that stigma be accompanied by the deprivation of a
right previously held under state law, the District Court found that the student held a property
interest in his degree and thus the plaintiff would suffer stigmatization with the necessary
deprivation of a property right previously held under state law. Id. Thus, the District Court
found that a liberty interest was implicated in a proceeding to rescind his degree. Id. The
classification of this proceeding as academic or disciplinary does not fall squarely within either
classification. On appeal, the University of Michigan acknowledged that the process employed
to rescind the degree had some elements of both an academic and a disciplinary dismissal.
Crook, 813 F.2d at 97. The University did not contest the application of the Goss standard in
determining how much process the student is due. See id.; discussion infra Part III.
121. 813 F.2d at 97 (assuming that student's liberty interests are implicated because
university did not challenge this aspect of the district court's ruling).
122. 646 F. Supp. 799 (D. R.I. 1986), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1988).
123. Gorman, 646 F. Supp. at 805. The district court relied on the rationale in Goss to
support its holding that a student's liberty interests are implicated when faced with a disciplinary
suspension. Id. The court stated: "[e]ven school suspensions ... implicate more than de
minimis liberty interests because such punishments 'could seriously damage the students'
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities
for higher education and employment." Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975)).
124. Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12. "It is also not questioned that a student's interest in
pursuing an education is included within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and
property." Id. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75).
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courts, relying on Goss and Dixon, have also held that a university student's
liberty interest is implicated when the student faces disciplinary suspension
12
or expulsion. 5
3. State Court Decisions
State courts have also addressed the question of whether a college
student attending a public university holds a protected liberty interest in his
education. In an action brought by a student who was expelled from the
University of Houston for academic dishonesty, the Court of Appeals of Texas
stated, "[a]ttendance at a state university is an interest protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment... ."26 Years later, the Supreme
Court of Texas addressed the issue of whether a medical student charged with
academic misconduct holds a protected liberty interest in receiving a medical
degree in University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than. 27 The student
challenged his dismissal from the University of Texas Medical School on the
ground that he was denied due course of law under the Texas Constitution 28
because of the manner in which he was dismissed from the university.'29 After
determining that there was no meaningful distinction between the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 30 and the Due Course Clause of the
Texas Constitution,' the Supreme Court of Texas applied federal interpreta125. See, e.g., Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(citing Goss and Dixon to support assertion that it is undisputed that the suspension or expulsion
of a college student implicates the student's liberty interests in public education and reputation);
Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (relying on
Goss to support holding that college student's suspension from a public university involves a
liberty interest because of serious threat of damage to student's reputation with other students
and teachers); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948, 952 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (noting that
defendant does not dispute fact that college students have liberty interests which are adversely
affected by suspension from university); Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 145 (N.D. N.Y.
1997) ("i]t is well settled that an expulsion from college is a stigmatizing event which
implicates a student's protected liberty interest."); Saurack, supra note 13, at 790-91 (detailing
other cases which have used Goss to find that university students have protected property and
liberty interests in their educations).
126. University of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685, 686-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
127. University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995).
128. See TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 19. The due course of law guarantee of the Texas
Constitution provides:
"No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or
in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land." Id.
129. Than, 901 S.W.2d at 928-29.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. TEx. CONST. art. 1,§ 19; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929 (holding that even though the
terms of the Due Course Clause of the Texas Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution are textually different there is no meaningful distinction between the
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tions of procedural due process in order to resolve this issue., 2 Applying

federal standards.3 3 to determine when a liberty interest is implicated, the
Supreme Court of Texas determined that the student held a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his graduate education." The court found that the
student held a liberty interest because the student faced grave damage to his
reputation and lost the opportunity to practice his chosen profession.' 35
Furthermore, the court noted that the stigma of being dismissed from the
university would likely prevent the student from finishing his education at
another academic institution."16 Finally, in Henderson State Univ. v.
Spandoni,'3 7 the court stated that "[tihere is no question but that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...gives rights to a student who
faces expulsion for misconduct at a tax-supported college or university.""'
These cases demonstrate that when a university seeks to suspend or
expel a student for misconduct, the action often intrudes upon the protected
liberty interests of students.' 39 It is quite clear that students are stigmatized in
that their reputation with their colleagues and teachers is damaged."
Additionally, liberty interests are implicated because students who have been
expelled from a state university may not be able to enroll at another

university.' 4 ' Also, the fact that a student may suffer the loss of future
employment opportunities implicates a liberty interest as well."42 When this
two).

132. Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929 (considering federal interpretations of procedural due
process to be persuasive authority).
133. Id. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)
(defining protected liberty interests); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (holding that
suspension of high school students implicates liberty interests).
134. Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929-30.
135. Id. at 930. The student involved in this case was a medical student and without his
medical degree would not be allowed to practice medicine. This is why the court found that the
student would lose his opportunity to practice his chosen profession. Id.
136. Id.
137. 848 S.W.2d 951 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
138. Id. at 953. In this case, the student, Spandoni, battered another student by striking
him in the face with a beer bottle. Id. at 952. Spandoni was subsequently suspended from the
school by an associate dean and, pursuant to school policy, Spandoni appealed to the university
disciplinary committee. Id. The committee upheld the suspension whereupon Spandoni
brought suit seeking an injunction to prohibit the suspension. Id.
139. See discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
140. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975).
141. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
142. See, e.g., id. (noting that without sufficient education students may not be able to
earn sufficient livelihood); Goss, 419 U.S. at 575 (noting that charges of misconduct could
interfere with future employment opportunities); University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v.
Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (stating that student charged with academic misconduct
may lose opportunity to practice his chosen profession); Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2139 n.41
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damage to the student's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' 43 occurs
and is combined with the deprivation of a right previously held under state
4 it is
law, namely the property right a student has to receive his education,'
45
infringed.
also
is
student
the
of
clear that the liberty interest
B.

THE STUDENT'S PROPERTY INTEREST IN A COLLEGE EDUCATION

1. Supreme CourtDecisions
Just as with the determination as to whether a university student has a
protected liberty interest in his education, the United States Supreme Court
has yet to hold specifically that university students hold protected property
interests in their collegiate educations or degrees.'" In Horowitz, 47 the Court
declined to specifically reach the question of whether or not the medical
student's dismissal infringed on any constitutionally protected interest the
student may have had in her medical education) 4 A finding that such a
protected interest did exist would have triggered the procedural protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 49 Instead, the Supreme
Court merely assumed that the medical student had a property interest in her
education 5 ° and held that even if the student had such a protected property
(demonstrating significant difference between earning power of those who hold university
degrees and those who do not hold such degrees).
143. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971).
144. See discussion infra Part II.B.
145. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (holding that stigma must be
accompanied by the deprivation of a right previously held under state law). Students hold
property interests in their educations and these are rights previously held under state law which
fulfill the Paulrequirement to find that a liberty interest has also been infringed. Cf. Nash v.
Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948, 952 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (recognizing that students hold both
property and liberty interests which are affected by suspension from college); Hart v. Ferris
State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (noting that threat of expulsion from
college implicates both property and liberty interests in public education and reputation);
Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137. Picozzi notes that the Paul court used Goss as an example
supporting the proposition that stigma must be accompanied by the deprivation of a right
previously held under state law. Id. See also Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 (noting that in finding a
liberty interest in Goss, the Court pointed out that there was a statutorily conferred property
right to education and that the suspension of the students resulted in a deprivation of this right).
146. Saurack, supra note 13, at 790.
147. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). For the
facts of the Horowitz case, see supra note 75.
148. Id. at 84-85.
149. Id. at 82.
150. Id. at 84-85. In Horowitz, the medical student did not allege that she was deprived
of a protected property interest when she was academically dismissed from the medical school.
Id. at 82. In order to invoke the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
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interest, the medical student was already provided all the process mandated
by the Constitution.' Additionally, even if the student could have proven

that she was entitled to her seat in the medical school because of the operation
of state law, the Court still would have passed on this issue because the

student was provided with all the process that due process required.'
In Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,'53 the Court again assumed

that a university student held a constitutionally protected property interest in
his education."

In Ewing, the student was dismissed from a joint-degree

program for failure to pass a qualifying examination.'

The student then

Process Clause, the student must have alleged that her dismissal deprived her of a protected
liberty or property interest. ILd.While the student alleged that she was deprived of a protected
liberty interest, she did not allege that she was deprived of a property interest. Id. If the student
had alleged that the medical school's actions had infringed on protected property interests, the
student would have been required to show that her place at the medical school was a property
interest recognized by the state law of Missouri. Id. This is because property interests stem
from independent sources, such as state law. See id.; Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); accord Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972).
Nonetheless the Court did address the property interests that students hold in receiving higher
educations by assuming the existence of a protected property interest in this case. Horowitz,
435 U.S. at 84-85.
151. Id. The Court stated: "[a]ssuming the existence of a liberty or property interest,
respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment
requires." Id. The Court's decision regarding the existence of a protected liberty interest in the
medical student's education is discussed in Part II.A.1. The Court's decision that the school
provided the student with all the process that was constitutionally required rested primarily on
the fact that this was an academic, rather than a disciplinary, expulsion. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at
87-91. See also supra note 15 (noting that courts are reluctant to intrude on academic dismissal
proceedings).
152. See supra note 97 (discussing the application of the Ashwander doctrine to college
students' claims that they were denied due process in being dismissed from state colleges). See
also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85 (agreeing with the district court's determination that the student
was afforded all the process she was due which made it unnecessary to specifically determine
if a protected liberty or property interest was implicated).
153. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
154. Id. at 223. See also Saurack, supra note 13, at 790.
155. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215-17. Ewing, the student, enrolled in the University of
Michigan's "Inteflex" program in 1975. Id. at 215. The "Inteflex" program was a six-year
program which allowed the student to obtain both an undergraduate and medical degree upon
successful completion of the program. Id. After successfully completing four years of study,
the student must pass a qualifying examination, known as the NBME Part I, in order to advance
to the final two years of study. Id. at 215-16. In 1981, Ewing completed his four years of study
and thereafter took the NBME Part I. Id. at 216. Upon taking the exam, Ewing failed five of
the seven subjects that were tested, and received a total score of 235. Id. The score required
in order to pass the exam was 345, and a 380 was required in order to receive a state license to
practice medicine. Id. In July, 1981, the Promotion and Review Board reviewed Ewing's status
and voted unanimously to drop him from the program. Id. Ewing appealed the Board's
decision, which was ultimately reaffirmed. Id. In August, 1981, Ewing appealed the Board's
decision to the Executive Committee of the Medical School. Id. Ewing was given an
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brought an action against the Regents of the University of Michigan on a
number of theories, including one in which he alleged that he had been
arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a protected property interest in his
continued enrollment in the joint-degree program. 5 6 The lower courts held
that the student did indeed hold a protected property interest in his degree
which triggered the protections of the Due Process Clause.'57 However, the
Supreme Court specifically declined to so hold, and instead merely assumed
the existence of a protected property right." 8 The Court reasoned that it was
unnecessary to determine specifically whether the student did indeed hold a
protected property interest because the facts of the case demonstrated that the
university did not act in an arbitrary fashion in dismissing the student.5 9

opportunity to be heard, after which the Executive Committee unanimously denied his request
for a leave of absence which would allow him to retake the NBME Part I. Id. Twice in 1982,
Ewing appealed the Board's decision to the Executive Committee, which twice more denied his
request for a leave of absence to retake the NBME Part I. Id. at 217.
156. Id. Ewing's complaint set forth three separate theories of recovery, two of which
were based on state law and the other based on federal law. Id. The state law claims asserted
that the University's actions constituted a breach of contract or, alternatively, were barred by
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. In his federal claim, Ewing asserted that he had a
protected property interest in his continued enrollment in the program and that his dismissal by
the Board and the Executive Committee was arbitrary and capricious, thereby violating his right
to substantive due process. Id.
157. Id. at 220-21. In holding that the student held a constitutionally protected property
interest in his education, the Court of Appeals held that an implied contract right to continued
enrollment existed between the student and the university and that this implied contract
qualified as a protected property interest. Id. at 221; Ewing, 742 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 214.

158. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222-23.
159. Id. Again, the application of the Ashwander doctrine becomes apparent. See supra
note 97 (discussing the Ashwander doctrine). Indeed, in this instance, the Court specifically
cites Ashwander as a means of justifying its decision to only assume that a property interest
exists. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222-23. The court states:
In this case Ewing contends that [substantive due process] review is
appropriate because he had a constitutionally protected property interest
in his continued enrollment ....

But remembering Justice Brandeis'

admonition not to 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the facts to which it is to be applied,' Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (concurring
opinion), we again conclude, as we did in Horowitz, that the precise facts
disclosed by the record afford the most appropriate basis for decision.
We therefore accept the University's invitation to 'assume the existence
of a constitutionally protectible property right in [Ewing's] continued
enrollment,' and hold that even if Ewing's assumed property interest gave
rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause to continued
enrollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record disclose no
such action.

1999]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

While the Supreme Court may be reluctant to address the specific issue
of whether university students hold protected property interests in receiving
their educations or degrees, the Court has considered the issue in the context
of high school disciplinary dismissals. In Goss v. Lopez," ° the Supreme Court
specifically held that high school students do possess property interests in
receiving their educations which therefore entitles them to the procedural
16
protections of the Due Process Clause when being dismissed from school. '

In Goss, the Court reasoned that because Ohio law provided a free public
education to those between the ages of five and twenty-one, and mandated
compulsory attendance for a school year of not less than thirty-two weeks, the
students had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit created by state
law. 62 When the state sought todismiss the students in Goss for disciplinary
reasons, the Court held that the students must be given the process required
by the Due Process Clause. 163 Because Ohio had guaranteed each of its
citizens a public education, "the State is constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is
protected by the Due Process Clause.. . ."'" Therefore, because the students
held protected property rights in their primary and secondary educations, the
students the
state, in seeking to deprive them of this right, must afford the
65
minimum procedures mandated by the Due Process Clause.
2.

Lower FederalCourt Decisions

In Gasparv. Bruton, '6 a nursing student at a state-supported vocational
school was dismissed for incompetence and unsatisfactory performance in the
clinical training program of the nursing school. 67 The student then brought

160.
161.

419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 573-75. For a discussion of the facts of Goss, see supra Part I.A.1 and

accompanying notes.
162.
163.
disciplinary
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 574. As to how much process these and other students involved in
proceedings are due, see discussion infra Part III.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
Id.
513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).

167. Id. at 846. Gaspar was a nursing student at the Gordon Cooper Area VocationalTechnical School. Id. at 845. In order to attend classes at the vocational school, Gaspar was
required to pay a specific enrollment fee. Id. The program consisted of both classroom and
clinical training. Id. While Gaspar passed the classroom courses satisfactorily, the school
contended that her clinical performance was both incompetent and unsatisfactory. Id. at 846.
Before she was dismissed, Gaspar was placed on probation and advised of her deficiencies in
the clinical aspects of nursing. Id. at 845. When there was no improvement in her clinical
performance, the school board dismissed her from the nursing program. Id. at 845-46.
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suit claiming that she was denied due process when she was dismissed from
the nursing program." In holding that the student did indeed have a protected
property right in her education which triggered the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause, the court of appeals relied on the reasoning in Goss
v. Lopez.'69 The court of appeals stated:
We have no difficulty in concluding that in light of Goss,
... where the Supreme Court recognized a property right in
public school students that certainly such a right must be
recognized to have vested with Gaspar, and the more
prominently so in that she paid a specific, separate fee for
enrollment and attendance at the Gordon Cooper School.'
In this case, by paying a separate fee for enrollment at the tax-supported
vocational school, the student had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
receipt of a specific benefit which could not be deprived without due process
of law. 7 ' Furthermore, in Harris v. Blake,17 2 it was held that when a
university student pays tuition in order to attend a state-supported university,
the payment of tuition secures an individual's claim of entitlement.' 73 As a
result of this claim of entitlement, a property interest74 vested in the student by
way of enrollment at a state-supported university.
Federal district courts have had no difficulty in finding that university
students hold protected property interests in their degrees. 75 In Ross v.
PennsylvaniaState Univ., 76 the court held that university statements of policy
and the experience of former students created a reasonable expectation for

168. Id. at 846.
169. Id. at 850.
170. Id.; Saurack, supra note 13, at 791.
171. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding
that in order to have a protected property interest in a benefit, one must have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to the specific benefit).
172. 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 422.
174. Id.
175. See Crook v. Baker, 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 813 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1987). For the facts of this case see supra Part II.A.2 and
accompanying notes. The district court held that because the student had fulfilled the
requirements for the conferral of a master's degree promulgated by the University of Michigan,
the student had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the degree. Crook, 584 F. Supp. at 1554.
Furthermore, in Roth it was held that in order to hold a property interest in a benefit, one must
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit. Id. at 1553. The district court therefore
concluded that the student's legitimate claim of entitlement to his master's degree thus qualified
as a protected property interest. Id. at 1554.
176. 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
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students that they will receive their degrees if they perform the requisite work
in an acceptable manner and pay their tuition." This reasonable expectation
qualified as a protected property interest.17 1 Often, the question as to whether

or not a student holds a protected property interest in his collegiate education

or the conferral of a degree is not vigorously contested. 79 Even where the
question might be in dispute, it is often resolved in favor of finding that the
university student does hold a protected property interest in receiving his

education." 8 Given the fact that university students pay tuition to attend state-

supported universities and coupled with the fact that students often hold
reasonable expectations based on university statements and regulations,
district courts often have no difficulty in determining that a protected property
interest of the student is implicated when the university seeks to dismiss
8

him.1 1

3. State Court Decisions
Similar to the federal courts, state courts have also addressed the
question of whether a student holds a protected interest in his education such
that he may not be deprived of his education without due process of law. In
California, a court held that by the act of matriculation to a state-supported
college and by the payment of fees thereto, a contract is created between the
institution and the student which by its nature incorporates constitutional
177. Id. at 152.
178. Id. See also discussion supra Part I.A.2 and accompanying notes (discussing what
constitutes a protected property interest).
179. See, e.g., Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(noting that it is undisputed that a suspension or expulsion implicates a student's property
interest in public education); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948, 952 (M.D. Ala. 1985)
(stating that the defendant does not dispute that students have a property interest in receiving
their educations which are adversely affected by suspension from a state university).
180. See, e.g., Stoller v. College of Med., 562 F. Supp. 403,412 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd,
727 F.2d 1101 (3rd Cir. 1984) (relying on Goss, Gasparand Horowitz to hold that graduate
student has a property interest in continuing his education); Picozzi v. Sandlow, 623 F. Supp.
1571, 1576 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 742 F.2d 913,
915 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[a]n implied understanding that a student shall not be arbitrarily dismissed
from his university is a property interest .... ") (noting that while defendant did not directly
contest the fact that the student has a property interest, defendant did contend that there was no
protected interest at stake in the case)). But cf. Alexander v. Kennedy-King College, No. 88 C
2117, 1990 WL 179691, *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1990) (refraining from making final
determination as to whether student had property interest in education because Illinois law is
unclear as to whether a property interest exists in a degree expected from a college); Osteen v.
Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 222 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that in the Seventh Circuit, whether a
university student has a property right to continued attendance at a university is an open
question).
181. See Saurack, supra note 13, at 791.
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principles of due process." Although the California court did not specifically
label this as a property interest, such a contract could form a basis on which
the student could reasonably rely so that he would not be deprived of his
education without due process, thereby qualifying his interest in receiving his
education as a protected property interest. 3 Finally, other state courts,
without classifying the protected interest as either a liberty or property
interest, have unequivocally held that college students at state-supported
universities are entitled to the procedural protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause when facing expulsion for misconduct. 4
These cases demonstrate that university students hold protected liberty
interests in their educations which therefore trigger the procedural protections
of the Due Process Clause. 5 From the foregoing discussion it is clear that,
by paying separate fees in order to attend state-supported universities, students
have protected property interests in their educations.8 6 Moreover, if a student
87
must have more than a "unilateral expectation" of a specific benefit,
certainly the payment of tuition by the student gives rise to more than a
unilateral expectation that the student will receive his degree upon completion
of his course work. 8 8 This is so because a contract is formed between the

182. Anderson v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 99 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972). The court held that the contract between the student
and the university contained two implied conditions. First, that the student would not be
arbitrarily expelled, and second, that the student would follow reasonable rules and regulations
of the university that if breached, may in the proper case cause him to be expelled. Id.
183. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972) (holding
that in order to have a property interest a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
a benefit); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,601-02 (1972) (concluding that implied contracts
constitute property interests). Thus, because the student has a property interest in a benefit that
stems from state law, namely that of contracts, the student in Anderson had a protected property
interest. This argument is further bolstered by the fact that the California Court of Appeals
proceeded to determine if the student was denied procedural due process. See Anderson, 99 Cal.
Rptr. at 536.
184. See Henderson State Univ. v. Spandoni, 848 S.W.2d 951,953 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993)
("There is no question but that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... gives
rights to a student who faces expulsion for misconduct at a tax-supported college or
university."); University of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
("Attendance at a state university is an interest protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment... ").
185. See discussion supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
186. See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (concluding that student
has protected property interest in receiving her education when she paid separate fee to enroll
in higher education program); Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that
graduate student has claim of entitlement to education when he pays tuition which qualifies as
protected property interest).
187. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
188. Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2137.
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university and the student when the university accepts the student's tuition
payment and provides instruction in return. 9 This contract not only makes
90
the expectation that the student will receive his degree bilateral, it also

qualifies as a protected property interest because contracts are "created ... by

existing rules... that stem from an independent source... [namely] state law
Thus, because state law governs the creation and execution of
".9.
contracts, these contracts not only flow from state law, but also "secure certain
benefits [which] support claims of entitlements to those benefits," thereby

qualifying the student's interest in pursuing his education as a protected
property interest. 92

M.

THE CURRENT SCOPE OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE IN UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

"The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history
of procedure."' 93 While adults have routinely been afforded the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause when the state seeks to deprive them of
a protected interest or incarcerate them for criminal acts, children, on the other
9
hand, have often been denied the procedural protections which adults enjoy."
The rationale for denying children the procedural rights afforded to adults was
grounded in the notion that the relationship of the state to the child was that
of parenspatriae.' This doctrine was carried over to the university context,
7
and universities were often held to stand in loco parentis'9 6 to the student.
189.
190.

191.
192.

Id.
Id.

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
Id.

Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). The Court stated:
From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have
been tolerated-indeed insisted upon-between the procedural rights
accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions,
there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. [Ilit
has been held that the juvenile is. not entitled to bail, to indictment by
grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury. It is frequent practice that
rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not
observed in the case of juveniles.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
193.
194.

195.

196.

Id. at 17.

See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990). Black's dictionary provides the

following definition of in loco parentis:

In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a
parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. "Loco parentis" exists when
[a] person undertakes care and control of another in absence of such
supervision by [the] latter's natural parents and in the absence of formal
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For many years it was held that universities could promulgate any rules or
regulations that they deemed necessary for the betterment of the student and

were given virtually free reign in expelling students for even the most minor
infractions.'98 Because of this relationship, many courts, until the 1960s, took

a hands-off approach to student challenges revolving around university
disciplinary action.'99 However, in the course of the social upheaval that

marked that decade, judicial attitudes regarding the relationship of the state,
school, and university to the student began to change.2'

By the end of the

decade it was readily recognized that the constitutional rights secured to adults
are also secured to children by the Constitution.20 '
A.

THE LANDMARK DECISION: DIXON V. ALABAMA
EDUCATION

STATE BOARD OF

In Dixon,' six students were expelled from Alabama State College for
various acts of misconduct. 3 In expelling the students, the university did not
provide them with either notice of the charges against them or with an
opportunity to present their 'side of the matter before receiving their expulsions.' The only notice that they received was a letter telling them that they
had been expelled from the university for their participation in various

Id.

legal approval, and is temporary in character and is not to be likened to
an adoption which is permanent. Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280, 377
P.2d 953, 955.

197. Richmond, supra note 12, at 290. For a discussion of the in loco parentis theory
and cases dealing with the application of this doctrine in the university context, see id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 290-91, 295.
200. Id. at 291.
201.
"[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). "It can hardly be argued that students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights... at the school house gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons'
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State.
Id. at 511.
202. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
203. Id. at 151-54. The students were expelled from the college for various actions they
took in protesting the segregation policies of the State of Alabama. Id. at 152 n.3.
204. Id. at 151-52.
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unspecified actions. 205 The students then brought suit against the Alabama
State Board of Education, claiming they were denied due process because they
did not receive any notice of the charges against them or an opportunity to be
heard before being expelled. 2 6
Id. at 151. The letter reads:
Dear Sir:
This communication is the official notification of your expulsion from
Alabama State College as of the end of the 1960 Winter Quarter.
As reported through the various news media, The State Board of
Education considered this problem of Alabama State College at its
meeting on this past Wednesday afternoon. You were one of the students
involved in this expulsion-directive by the State Board of Education. I
was directed to proceed accordingly.
On Friday of last week, I had made the recommendation that any
subsequently-confirmed action would not be effective until the close of
this 1960 Winter Quarter so that each student could thus have the
opportunity to take this quarter's examinations and to qualify for as much
OH-Pt credit as possible for the 1960 Winter Quarter.
The State Board of Education, which is made responsible for the
supervision of the six higher institutions at Montgomery, Normal,
Florence, Jacksonville, Livingston, and Troy (each of the other three
institutions at Tuscaloosa, Auburn and Montevallo having separate
boards) includes the following in its regulations (as carried in page 32 of
The 1958-59 Registration-Announcement of Alabama State College):
Pupils may be expelled from any of the Colleges:
a. For willful disobedience to the rules and regulations established for
the conduct of the schools.
b. For the willful and continued neglect of studies and continued
failure to maintain the standards of efficiency required by the rules and
regulations.
c. For Conduct Prejudicial to the School and for Conduct Unbecoming
a Student or Future Teacher in Schools of Alabama, for Insubordination
and Insurrection, or for Inciting Other Pupils to like Conduct.
d. For any conduct involving moral turpitude.
Iii at 152 n.3. The letter was signed by H. Councill Trenholm, President of the Alabama State
University. Id.
206. Jd. at 151 n.1.
The complaint alleges that "Defendant Trenholm on March 4, 1960,
notified plaintiffs of their expulsion effective March 5, 1960, without any
notice, hearing, or appeal," and further avers:
Expulsion from Alabama State College came without warning, notice of
charges, opportunity to appear before defendants or at any other hearing,
opportunity to offer testimony in defense, cross-examination of accusers,
appeal, or other opportunity to defend plaintiff's right not to be arbitrarily
expelled from defendant College. Defendants' expulsion order, issued by
the defendants functioning under the statutes, laws and regulations of the
State of Alabama, thereby deprived plaintiffs of rights protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
205.
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The issue presented to the Fifth Circuit was whether, under the

Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, these students had a right to
any sort of notice or a hearing before being expelled from the college. 7 The
district court held that these students had no such right'" because attendance

at college was a privilege.2' In reversing the district court's decision, the
Fifth Circuit held that even if attendance at a state college was a privilege, "it
nonetheless remains true that the State cannot condition the granting of even
a privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to procedural due
process."2 0 After finding that the liberty interests of these students were
implicated by the board's actions such that the procedural protections of the
due process clause were required,21 the court then proceeded to determine
22
exactly how much process these students were due.
The Fifth Circuit determined that due process required the College to
give the students notice of the specific charges against them and an opportu-

nity to be heard in their own defense before expelling them. 2 3 Noting that a
potential for arbitrary action on the part of the board exists because of the

possibility for the capricious application of the university's regulations to the

207. Id. at 154.
208. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960),
rev'd, 294 F.2d 150. The district court stated: "courts have consistently upheld the validity of
regulations that have the effect of reserving to the college the right to dismiss students at any
time for any reason without divulging its reason other than its being for the general benefit of
the institution." 186 F. Supp. at 951. Hence, the application of the in loco parentis doctrine
to student challenges to the actions of a university. See 294 F.2d at 156. During the appeal, the
Board of Education pointed to the following regulation to support the college's assertion that
the students had waived any right to notice or a hearing before being expelled. The italicized
portion refers to the thought, on the college's behalf, that the college stands in loco parentisto
the student.
Attendance at any college is on the basis of a mutual decision of the
student's parents and of the college. Attendance at a particular college is
voluntary and is different from attendance at a public school where the
pupil may be required to attend a particular school which is located in the
neighborhood or district in which the pupil's family may live. Just as a
student may choose to withdraw from a particular college at any time for
any personally-determined reason, the college may also at any time
decline to continue to accept responsibilityfor the supervision and
service to any student with whom the relationship becomes unpleasant
and difficult.
Id. (emphasis added).
209. Dixon, 186 F. Supp. at 950. "The right to attend a public college or university is
not in and of itself a constitutional right." Id.
210. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156; Richmond, supra note 12, at 295.
211. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes.
212. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
213. Id. at 157-59.
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facts of the case, the court held that it was necessary to provide these students
with notice and an opportunity to be heard.2" 4 With regard to notifying the
students of the actions to be taken against them, the court required that such
notice contain a statement of the specific charges against the students and the
grounds which would justify their expulsion if the charges are proven. 15 The
court held that the nature of the hearing should vary depending on the
circumstances, but that in this instance something more than an informal
interview with college administrators would be required. 216 Given the fact that
these students were charged with misconduct, a hearing that allows the
administrators to hear both sides is required because the charge of misconduct
"depends upon a collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct,
easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses. 2 7 The court did not
require a "full-dress judicial hearing," but instead only required that the
rudiments of an adversary proceeding should be preserved. 1 While the
student need not be given the right to cross-examine witnesses, the student
must be provided with an opportunity to present evidence to the board in the
form of oral testimony or affidavits of witnesses in support of his defense.21 9
If the student is provided with these procedures, then the requirements of due
process will have been satisfied by the college. 220 Dixon thus established the
principle that students involved in university judicial proceedings must be
accorded, at a minimum, notice of the charges against them and an opportunity
to present their own version of the facts to university officials.22 '
B.

IN THE WAKE OF DIXON: THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL

Prior to the Dixon decision, university officials could act with impunity
in suspending or expelling students from the university with courts deferring
to the judgment of the university administrators and refusing to impose
procedural safeguards on the disciplinary process.222 After Dixon was
decided, the law regarding the due process rights of university students
"turned 180 degrees."223 No longer could university officials act with blatant
214. Id. at 157.
215. Id. at 158.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 158-59.
218.

219.
220.

Id. at 159.

Id. See also Richmond, supra note 12, at 295.
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159.

221. See Richmond, supra note 12, at 295; Swem, supra note 15, at 369.
222. See supra notes 193-201 and discussion in Part III.
223. Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027,
1031 (1969).
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disregard of a student's constitutional rights because "[w]henever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution requires that
the act be consonant with due process of law."'224 Now, courts must examine
the procedures a university employs in disciplining students to ensure that
such procedures comply with the requirements of due process. However,
because due process is a flexible concept,225 and because of the Supreme
Court's dictum in Goss 26 that "[longer suspensions or expulsions [from
school] ... may require more formal procedures,""2 2 lower federal courts are
in a state of confusion as to the amount of process a university student is
constitutionally required to receive.22 This confusion has led to a myriad of
lawsuits regarding what amount of process and procedure a student facing
university discipline must be afforded. 9 In fact, the right to the assistance of,

224.

Dixon, 294 F.2d at 155. In the same paragraph, the Dixon Court further stated:
The minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process
depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties involved.
As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 1951, 341 U.S. 123, 163, 71 S.Ct. 624,
644, 95 L.Ed. 817: Whether the ex parte procedure to which the
petitioners were subjected duly observed 'the rudiments of fair play', * *
* cannot * * * be tested by mere generalities or sentiments abstractly
appealing. The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely
affected, the manner in which it was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection
implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the
balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished - these are some
of the considerations which must enter into the judicial judgment.
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 155.
225. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
.226. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, the students had received varying
lengths of suspension from school with the longest suspension being ten days. In holding that
the suspended students must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to being
suspended, the Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to suspensions not exceeding ten
days. Id. at 581-84.
227. Id. at 584.
228. Swem, supra note 15, at 372-73 (citing Annotation, Right to Assistance by Counsel
in AdministrativeProceedings, 33 A.L.R.3d 229, 286-89 (1970)).
229. While not specifically addressed in this article, students have brought lawsuits
regarding the procedures they are entitled to when faced with disciplinary action. The
challenged procedures include the type of notice and hearing afforded to the student; university
regulations regarding confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; whether a student is
entitled to the right against self-incrimination; rules regarding the admissibility of evidence;
whether the student has a right to a record or transcript of the hearing; appellate procedures
afforded to the student and possible bias on the part of disciplinary board members. Saurack,
supra note 13, at 793-800; Swem, supra note 15, at 368-81 (discussing court decisions in these
areas of procedure).
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or representation by, counsel was not addressed in Dixon2 30 and the Supreme
Court in Goss stated, "[w]e stop short of construing the Due Process Clause
to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions
must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel ..... 13' The
Supreme Court never reached the question of whether a universitty student had
232
the right to counsel when suspended or expelled from a state university.
Rather, the issue fell to the lower courts.
1. The Limited Role of Counsel
Generally, if a student retains legal counsel when faced with disciplinary
action, the role of counsel in such proceedings is limited to serving the student

in an advisory capacity. However, courts are split as to whether the student

has the right to counsel at all.233 In Esteban v. CentralMo. State College,2 '

two students were suspended from the college for various acts committed

during the course of two nights of student demonstrations.233 Initially, the
230. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157-59 (5th Cir. 1961);
Richmond, supra note 12, at 298.
231. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); Richmond, supra note 12, at 298.
232. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-84; Richmond, supra note 12, at 298.
233. See generallyRichmond, supra note 12, at 298-303; Saurack, supra note 13, at 79497; Swem, supra note 15, at 372-77; supra note 7. But cf. Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of
Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), af'd, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986). In Jaksa,the
court recognized that courts were split on the issue of whether a university student involved in
disciplinary proceedings has a right to representation by counsel. 597 F. Supp. at 1252. While
recognizing this split of authority, the court nevertheless held that because the proceedings
against the university student were not unduly complex and because the university did not
proceed against the student through an attorney, the student did not have a right to have the
presence or assistance of counsel during the disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 1251-52. See also
Saurack, supra note 13, at 795 n.80 (citing Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975)
(stating that in an academic dismissal proceeding the presence of attorneys "would serve no
useful purpose")); Madera v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2d Cir.
1967) (holding that student has no right to counsel in disciplinary proceeding); Gorman v.
University of R.I., 646 F. Supp. 799, 806 (D. R.I. 1986).
234. 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), appealafter remand, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.
Mo. 1968) (dismissing student's lawsuit), affid, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
235. Esteban, 277 F. Supp. at 650. The district court's memorandum and order, 277 F.
Supp. 649, does not fully discuss the facts of the case. The facts are more fully developed in
the circuit court's opinion. See 415 F.2d at 1079-83. Apparently, on March 29 and 30, 1967,
there were student demonstrations on or near the campus of Central Missouri State College. Id.
at 1079-80. Two students, Esteban and Roberds, who were on probation for previous
infractions, were suspended for their actions in relation to the events of March 29 and 30, 1967.
Id. at 1079-83. Esteban was suspended for his actions in "contributing to and participating in
..." the demonstrations by "resist[ing] efforts of one Dr. M. L. Meverden in dispersing said
mass gathering, fail[ing] and refus[ing] to identify [himself] to Dr. Meverden as requested and
" Id. at 1081us[ing] vile and obscene language towards and threatened a resident assistant ....
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students were orally advised of the charges against them and were allowed to
give an explanation for their conduct to the Dean of Men.236 The two students
were then suspended by the Dean of Men and thereafter brought suit seeking
23 7
injunctive relief on the basis that they were denied procedural due process.
After reviewing the "considerable judicial activity in [the] field of students'
rights vis-a-vis the rights of university administrators,"23' 8 the court concluded
that the oral notice and hearing provided to the students was constitutionally
infirm. 239 The district court then ordered the college to grant the students a
new hearing and outlined the procedures which the college was to afford the
students.2' Included in these procedures was the district court's requirement
that the college permit the students to have counsel present with them at the
hearing to advise them, but the attorney would not be allowed to question
witnesses brought against the students.24'
82. Roberds was suspended for his actions in "contributing to and participating in.. ." the
demonstrations because he "directed correspondence to Mr. E. J. Cantrell of the Missouri

Legislature evidencing [his] intention to participate in such mass gatherings, did thereafter

advise Dean Hollis Chalquist, Dean of Men, of [his] intention to participate in such
demonstration at which time [he was] specifically advised that such participation would result
in immediate suspension from [the] .. .[c]ollege and that [he] did thereafter continue to
contribute to and participate in said mass gathering all of which actions were in violation of the
terms and provisions of [his] disciplinary probation." Id. at 1082.
236. Esteban, 277 F. Supp. at 650.
237. Id. See also Esteban, 415 F.2d at 1081 (discussing the procedural history of the
case).
238. Esteban, 277 F. Supp. at 650.
239. Id. at 650-52. The court found the procedures used to be infirm because the notice
given to the students did not adequately inform them of the grounds upon which action was
being taken by the university. Id. at 651. See also Esteban,415 F.2d at 1081. Also, the district
court held that the hearing procedure afforded to the students, namely the opportunity to give
an explanation of their conduct to one Dr. Chalquist, did not satisfy the requirements of
procedural due process because Dr. Chalquist was only one of a number of persons on the
disciplinary board which decided to suspend the students. Esteban, 277 F. Supp. at 651. See
also Esteban, 415 F.2d at 1081.

240.
241.

Esteban, 277 F. Supp. at 651-52.
Id. The court ordered that the students be afforded the following procedures:
(1) a written statement of the charges to be furnished each plaintiff [the
students] at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing; (2) the hearing
shall be conducted before the President of the college; (3) plaintiffs shall
be permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing any affidavits or
exhibits which the college intends to submit at such hearing; (4) plaintiffs
shall be permitted to have counsel present with them at the hearing to
advise them; (5) plaintiffs shall be afforded the right to present their
version as to the charges and to make such showing by way of affidavits,
exhibits, and witnesses as they desire; (6) plaintiffs shall be permitted to
hear the evidence against them, and plaintiffs (not their attorney) may
question at the hearing any witness who gives evidence against them; (7)
the President shall determine the facts of each case solely on the evidence
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Eleven years after the Esteban decision, in Gabrilowitzv. Newman' 42 the
First Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the due
process balancing test promulgated two years earlier in Mathews v. Eldridge.3
required that a student have the assistance of counsel. The student, facing
both disciplinary action by the university and criminal charges stemming from

the same event, brought suit seeking an injunction prohibiting the University
of Rhode Island from enforcing a university regulation barring the presence
of legal counsel at the disciplinary hearing. 2" The student sought to have

counsel present at the hearing in order to advise him of the ramifications of
any statements he might make which could be prejudicial to him in the
pending criminal case.245 The district court granted the injunction and the
university appealed claiming that the weight of authority was against the right
of a student to have the assistance of counsel.246 Balancing the factors set
forth in Mathews, the First Circuit held that in this context, where the student
faced disciplinary action and concomitant criminal charges, due process

required that counsel be present for the limited role of advising the student in
order to protect his rights at the criminal trial.247
Applying the Mathews factors to the student's circumstances, the First
Circuit found that both the student's private interest and the risk of erroneous

presented at the hearing therein and shall state in writing his finding as to
whether or not the student charged is guilty of the conduct charged and
the disposition to be made, if any, by way of disciplinary action; (8) either
side may, at its own expense, make a record of the events at the hearing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
242. 582F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
243. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The factors to be considered are set out supra Part I.B.
244. Gabrilowit, 582 F.2d at 101-02. The student, a senior at the University of Rhode
Island, faced both expulsion from the university and criminal charges for assault with the intent
to commit rape on a fellow student. Id. at 101. While the university regulations prohibited the
student from having counsel present at the hearing, the regulations did allow the student to have
the "assistance of an advisor of his/her choice from the community." Id. at 101-02.
245. Id. at 102-04. The student, in effect, faced a Hobson's Choice by testifying in the
disciplinary proceeding and having the statements used against him in the pending criminal
proceeding, or he could refuse to testify at the disciplinary proceeding and risk the loss of a
college degree which was to be conferred upon him within a few weeks. Id. at 103. The issue
thus became whether the student was denied due process when he was forced to make the choice
as to whether to testify in the disciplinary proceeding without legal advice when faced with a
criminal charge stemming from the same conduct. Id. at 104. The student was not seeking a
ruling that his attorney should be allowed to participate in the hearing in a traditional sense - i.e.
that the attorney would take on the role of directly questioning witnesses. Id. at 101. The
student was merely seeking that counsel be present at the hearing to consult and advise him.
Id.
246. Id. at 102.
247. Id. at 106-07. The court, however, was careful to state that this holding would set
precedent only for a truly unusual situation. Id. at 106.
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deprivation of a protected interest depends on the choice he makes regarding
whether to testify at the disciplinary hearing.24 If the student were to testify,
249
he would risk self-incrimination and a possible prison term of twenty years.
If he chose not to testify, then he would risk the loss of his college degree.25 °
Furthermore, because the student was charged with assault with intent to rape
in both the university action and the criminal proceeding, the student's
testimony in the university judicial proceeding could potentially affect the
student in matters outside of the university.25 ' Noting that university
disciplinary proceedings are similar to criminal trials and stating "[o]nly a
lawyer is competent to cope with the demands of an adversary proceeding held
against the backdrop of a pending criminal case," the court found that the risk
to the student would be substantial with counsel present at the hearing, and
without counsel, the risk would be enormous.' Moreover, the burden on the
university would be slight because the student's attorney would only be
present at the hearing to advise the student, the attorney would not participate
in the presentation of evidence." 3 Given the gravity of the situation, and
balancing the proper factors, the First Circuit held that denying the student the
right to have an attorney present at the hearing to consult with and advise him
deprived him of due process of law.2s4
The question whether a student has a right to have counsel participate
more extensively beyond mere advice and consultation with a student involved
in university disciplinary proceedings was not addressed in Gabrilowitz. This
5 s and in Osteen
issue was addressed, however, in Hartv. FerrisState College"
25
v. Henley.
In both cases the students sought the right to have counsel
function in a more traditional way in that counsel should be allowed to address
the hearing board, present and object to documents, and cross-examine

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. The court noted that the only serious effect counsel would have on the

proceedings is that they may take longer to complete because the student would take time to
consult with his attorney as to which questions to answer and how to answer them. Id.at 10607.
254. Id.at 107.
255. 557 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mich. 1983). Inthis case the student was arrested and
charged with selling 12.4 grams of marijuana. Id. at 1380. Subsequently, the student faced
disciplinary action for violating the university's policy regarding conduct "which materially and
adversely affects the individual's suitability as a member of the College Community." Id. See
also Swem, supra note 15, at 375.
256. 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993). The facts of this case are set out supra, at notes 2-11.
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witnesses.257 Acknowledging that, at most, students have the right to be
advised by counsel during the disciplinary proceedings, 258 both courts held
that the Mathews balancing test did not require that counsel be allowed to take
on a more active role at the hearing. 259 Both courts found that the burden on
the university outweighed the students' interests and that the procedures
employed by the university afforded the students adequate safeguards against
the risk of erroneous suspension or expulsion. 2' From the foregoing
discussion, a general rule emerges that students involved in disciplinary
proceedings have, at most, the right to consult with and be advised by counsel
during the hearing, but are not entitled to have counsel take on a more active
role during the course of the proceedings.26 '
257. Hart,557 F. Supp. at 1385-88; Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225.
258. Hart,577 F. Supp. at 1386; Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225.
259. Hart, 577 F. Supp. at 1388; Osteen, 13 F.3d at 226.
260. Hart,577 F. Supp. at 1387-88; Osteen, 13 F.3d at 226. The Hart court recognized
that the private interest affected in university disciplinary actions is substantial in that expulsion
from a university is a dramatic event in a student's life and that an education is a vital interest.
577 F. Supp. at 1387. With regard to the risk of an erroneous expulsion, given that the student
was allowed to cross-examine witnesses herself, the probable value of allowing counsel to
conduct such cross-examinations as an additional procedural safeguard was minimal because
the student could cross-examine witnesses under the direction of her attorney. Id. at 1387-88.
Finally, while the fiscal burden on the university would not be great in allowing the student to
be represented by an attorney because the student would bear the expense, the burden on the
administration of the hearing would be substantial. Id. at 1388. The Hart court voiced concerns
that the active role of an attorney at the hearing would be intrusive "from the college's point of
view" in that the college might find it necessary to have counsel present to represent the
college's interests and to insure that the college's witnesses were not harassed by the student's
counsel during cross-examination. Id. Furthermore, the Hart court echoed the Dixon court's
concern that the disciplinary hearing not escalate into a "full-dress judicial hearing." Id. Thus,
the Hartcourt concluded that while the private interest affected may be substantial, the probable
value of the additional procedure was minimal and the burden on the college would be
significant. Id. After balancing the competing interests, the court held that the student's interest.
did not escalate to the degree necessary to overcome the university's interest, and thus the
student was not constitutionally entitled to be represented by trained legal counsel. Id.
Judge Posner, writing for the court in Osteen, applied an economic analysis in
weighing the competing interests. 13 F.3d at 225. Again, echoing the fears of judicializing the
university's disciplinary process, the burden of allowing the student to be represented by
counsel would place financial burdens on the operation of the university. Id. The university,
Judge Posner reasoned, would want to hire its own lawyer to prosecute the university's interests.
Id. Likening the relationship of universities to students as that of seller to customer, Judge
Posner reasoned that the university had "no incentive to jerry-rig its proceedings against the
student," because even public universities are dependent upon the academic marketplace. Id.
at 226. In effect, because the university was dependent upon the marketplace to attract students
to the university, the risk of erroneously suspending the student was small. Id. Thus, because
allowing the student to be represented by counsel would impose substantial burdens on the
university and because the risk of error was trivial, the court concluded that due process did not
require that the student be allowed to be represented by counsel. Id.
261. See also Swem, supra note 15, at 372-75 (detailing the debate amongst the lower
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2. Circumstances Where Due Process Requires Counsel to Take a More
Active Role
Due to the lack of binding precedent, some courts do not allow students
to have the assistance of counsel at a disciplinary hearing,262 other courts limit
the role of counsel to serving in an advisory capacity,263 and still other courts
have recognized that the student has the right to have counsel take a more
26 four
active role on his behalf during the hearing.2 '" In Speake v. Grantham,
students at the University of Southern Mississippi were summarily suspended
for their role in handing out leaflets falsely claiming that classes would be
canceled for two days due to the shooting event which occurred at Jackson
State University in May, 1970.2" The students then brought an action seeking
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction to
reinstate them as students at the University on the ground that their due
process rights were violated when they were suspended from the university
without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.267 Relying on the
Dixon decision, the court stated that "[iut is now well established that
courts as to whether the right to counsel, if required as an aspect of due process, includes the
right to have counsel function in an adversarial capacity or merely in an advisory capacity).
262. See, e.g., Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), afid, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that student did not have right to
counsel because the university did not proceed against student through counsel); Gorman v.
University of R.I., 646 F. Supp. 799, 806 (D. R.I. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 837

F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (both courts noting that weight of authority is against the right of the
student to have counsel present at disciplinary proceeding); Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ.
of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that law student did not have the right to have
legal counsel participate in disciplinary proceeding); Garshman v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 395
F. Supp. 912, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that medical student is literate and intelligent
individual who understands his rights and can express himself, and therefore concluding that
student does not have due process right to be represented by counsel); Richmond, supra note
12, at 298-303 (noting that court decisions vary regarding whether a student has the right to the
assistance of, or representation by counsel); Saurack, supra note 13, at 794-97 (stating that some
courts do not recognize the right of a student to have counsel present at disciplinary hearing);
Swem, supra note 15, at 372-77 (observing that several courts reject the notion that due process
gives the student the right to counsel at university disciplinary proceedings).
263. See discussion supra Part III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
264. Richmond, supra note 12, at 298-302 (detailing cases in which courts have held that
due process requires that student be represented by counsel); Saurack, supra note 13, at 794-97
(noting that some courts recognize that a student has the right to be represented by counsel);
Swem, supra note 15, at 373-75 (stating that some decisions give the student the full right to
counsel). See also discussion infra.

265. 317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970), affd per curiam, 440 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.
1971); Swem, supra note 15, at 374 n.90.
266. Speake, 317 F. Supp. at 1257-63.
267. Id. at 1257.
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precedent, as well as the most fundamental constitutional principles, require

an adequate notice of charges and the opportunity of a fair and reasonable

hearing... to accord with the requirements of procedural due process as a
prerequisite to disciplinary action ... "'26 The court granted the students'
motion, reinstating them as students at the university, but preserved the
university's right to take disciplinary action against the students pursuant to
procedures outlined by the court.269 Among the procedures outlined by the
court, the students and their counsel were given the right to cross-examine
witnesses at the hearing.270 As a result of the procedures delineated by the

court, counsel was permitted to participate in the hearing in his representative

capacity, as opposed to being a mere advisor."
When a university commences disciplinary action against a student and
proceeds to prosecute the student by utilizing legal counsel to represent the
university, due process entitles the student to be represented by counsel.272 In
French v. Bashful,2" ten students were suspended or expelled during
disciplinary hearings conducted by a third-year law student at Southern
University in New Orleans." 4 In determining whether the students were
constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel in light of these
circumstances, the court balanced the interests of the students against the

268. Id.
269. Id. at 1257-58.
270. Id. at 1258. The opinion of the court does not indicate any other reason, other than
the Dixon decision, as to why these students had the right to have counsel cross-examine
witnesses. Id.
271. Id. But cf.Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(holding that student is not constitutionally entitled to have counsel cross-examine witnesses);
Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that student is not entitled to be
represented by counsel in the sense that the attorney would be allowed to cross-examine
witnesses).
272. Richmond, supra note 12, at 299-300. Cf. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807
(2d Cir. 1967). In Wasson, the Second Circuit stated:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all
of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is noncriminal
in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual
concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of events...
should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available
sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are
fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.
Id. at 812.
273. 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969). The French case is also discussed in detail in
Richmond, supra note 12, at 299-300.
274. French,303 F. Supp. at 1334, 1337. The law student was chosen to prosecute these
students "because of his familiarity with legal proceedings." Id. at 1337.
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interests of the university.2" 5 Recognizing that the interests of the students
revolved around "an extremely valuable right," namely an education, and that
these students did not have the ability to conduct themselves in a manner
comparable to the law student who had been trained to operate in adversary
proceedings, the court held that due process required that these students were
entitled to be represented by retained legal counsel.27 As to the interests of
the university, the court reasoned that requiring the university to permit
retained legal counsel to represent these students would only place an
"inconsequential [burden on the university] compared to the vital interest of
' Therefore, "[i]f universities
the student in being represented by counsel."277
* * * provide their own lawyer to assist a tribunal, in those cases at least the
student can hardly be denied the right to his own counsel, even if... there is
no right to counsel generally in disciplinary proceedings."27 While the
number of universities using attorneys or law students to prosecute students
may be small, Frenchprovides a solid basis for examining instances in which
attorneys advise judicial administrators on how to prosecute certain disciplinary cases. 279
Finally, in Marin v. University of Puerto Rico,2 0 two students were
suspended from the University of Puerto Rico for distributing leaflets
denouncing election proceedings and for picketing in protest of their summary
suspensions from the university. 281 The students brought suit claiming that
their summary suspensions from the university violated due process in that
they were not given prior notice or a hearing before the administrator who

275. Id. at 1338.
276. Id. at 1337-38.
277. Id. at 1338. However, the court made it clear that requiring the university to
provide the students with appointed counsel would be a different matter. See id. The court
recognized that if the university was required to appoint legal counsel for the student, the costs
to the university would be burdensome. Id. The court opined that requiring a university to
appoint counsel for students would be too high a price for the college to pay in order to
discipline students. Id.
278. Id. (citing Wright, supra note 223, at 1075-76).
279. Richmond, supra note 12, at 299-300.
280. 377 F. Supp. 613 (D. P.R. 1974). This case is also discussed extensively by
Saurack, supra note 13, at 795-96.
281. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 617-18; see also Saurack,supra note 13, at 795-96. While
the students were given a full hearing, with counsel participating, before a disciplinary board,
the disciplinary board did not suspend the students. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 618. Rather, the
disciplinary board simply made findings as to whether the students were guilty of the charges
brought against them by the university. Id. The Board then referred their findings to a dean
who, acting on the findings, summarily suspended the students. Id. Under the General Rules
and Regulations of the University, the dean was given the authority to summarily suspend
students. Id. at 621.
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suspended them.2" 2 In weighing what procedural protections were required,
the court balanced the students' interests against the interests of the
The court found that the students' interests included attending
university.
classes and consulting faculty members, as well as utilizing university
resources and participating in the academic community. 2 4 Furthermore, the
court noted that the students had a general interest in receiving their
educations because an education was a necessary antecedent to engaging in
an occupation, which is an interest "long recognized... as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' '2 5 The court then recognized that
the university's interests included the protection of "life, limb, and property
(both public and private)," the need to preserve order which would allow
others to enjoy the educational opportunities available at the university, and
the protection of the academic process. 6 Balancing these interests, the court
held that because of the students' significant interests the university's interests
would not be unduly burdened by allowing these students to enjoy certain
procedural safeguards. 2 7 Among the procedural safeguards which the court
required was "a full, expedited evidentiary hearing... at which the student (c)
can present evidence and (d) cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e) with the
assistance of retained counsel .... ,28 8
The significant divergence in the holdings of lower federal courts
regarding a student's right to representation by counsel demonstrates the need
for an authoritative statement on this issue to be promulgated by the Supreme
Court.2 9 While due process may require that the student be given the right to
representation by counsel in limited circumstances, in most instances the
student has, at most, only the limited right to be assisted by counsel during
disciplinary proceedings. 2' Indeed, courts often determine that, except in the
282. Id.
283. Id. at 622-23; Saurack, supra note 13, at 796.
284. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 623.
285. Id. at 621-22 (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)).
286. Id. at 623; Saurack, supra note 13, at 796.
287. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 623.
288. Id. See also Saurack, supra note 13, at 796. The opinion does not make it clear
whether the students' counsel could conduct the cross-examination. Textually, the court's
opinion could be read as requiring that counsel's role be limited to only advising the student on
conducting the cross-examination. See Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 623. However, it appears that
the court envisioned that counsel be permitted to take a more active role when the court's
procedural requirements are read in light of the court's recital of the facts. In its factual
discussion, the court noted that the students had begin given a full hearing before the
disciplinary board with the students' counsel participating in that hearing. See id. at 618.
289. See Swem, supra note 15, at 375.
290. Id. at 372-75; see discussion supra Part III.B.1-2 and accompanying notes;
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most unusual circumstances, the burdens placed on the university by allowing

the student to be represented by counsel are not overcome by the probable
value to the student of this additional procedure in lessening the risk of an
erroneous suspension or expulsion.2 91 Nevertheless, given the significant
interests that are implicated when the student faces disciplinary proceedings
and the inherent risks of an erroneous suspension or expulsion of a student,
perhaps the balance of interests may shift in favor of requiring that the student
be represented by counsel.
IV.

RE-THINKING THE BALANCE: THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY
COUNSEL

It has been said so often by so many courts as to not require citation to
authority that neither is the law static nor does it exist in a vacuum. Current
precedent may be against the right of a student to be represented by retained
legal counsel when faced with disciplinary charges brought by a university,
but "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 21
Indeed, on occasion, "a voice can be heard in the wilderness challenging the
old orthodoxy. '" 93 Given the importance of the interest at stake, and the
existence of adequate procedural safeguards which would reduce whatever
burden may be placed upon a university, it is time to re-evaluate the rationale
precluding a student from being represented by counsel. 294 In fact, a student's
Richmond, supra note 12, at 298-302; Saurack, supra note 13, at 794-96.
291. Compare Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(applying the Mathews balancing test and holding that while affected private interest may be
substantial, right to representation by counsel would not significantly reduce the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of a right while imposing significant burdens on the university), and
Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the reduction in the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a protected interest and probable value to the student of representation by counsel
is trivial while costs and complexity of such a procedure is substantial to the university), and
Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aft'd, 787 F.2d
590 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that because proceedings against student were not unduly
complex nor did the university proceed against the student through counsel, due process did not
require that the student be represented by counsel at disciplinary hearing), with French v.
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding that because university proceeded to
prosecute student by employing third-year law student, due process required student to be
represented by retained legal counsel), and Matin v. University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.
P.R. 1974) (finding that students' interests outweighed the university's interests and thus
requiring that students be assisted by counsel when cross-examining witnesses).
292. OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
293. Wright, supra note 223, at 1029.
294. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. I I(b) (1998). Rule 11 (b) provides:
Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or
other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the

1999]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

"right to counsel, should the matter appear to him to be of sufficient gravity
to make legal assistance desirable, should receive ungrudging recognition" by
the courts. 95
When a university brings disciplinary action against a student and seeks
to suspend or expel him, it is undeniable that such action implicates interests
296 A
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
student's liberty interest is implicated because his reputation with his fellow
colleagues and instructors is stigmatized as a result of the university's
actions. 297 Moreover, a student's liberty interest is also implicated because
once suspended or expelled from a university, it is unlikely that he will be able
to enroll at another university and his future employment prospects may be
diminished.298 Additionally, a student holds a property interest in his degree
when he pays tuition to the university, thereby creating a legitimate claim of
entitlement to receiving the benefit of his education. 2' Regardless of whether
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, - (1) it is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Id. (emphasis added).
295. Arthur Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights and Responsibilities,
54 CAL. L. REv. 23, 37 (1966) (quoted in Wright, supra note 223, at 1075).
296. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
process of law ....
[I]t must not be forgotten, however small the community, however
familiar to one another the characters in the drama, that when a school
board undertakes to expel a ... student, it is undertaking to apply the
terrible organized force of the state, just as surely as it is applied by the
police, the courts, the prison warden, or the militia.
Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 207, 208 (W.D. N.C. 1972) (citing Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp.
702, 707 (W.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970)).
297. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574-75 (1975). See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433,437 (1971) (holding that liberty interests are implicated "where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him"); discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
298. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Goss, 419 U.S. at 575. See also discussion supra Part IL.A and
accompanying notes.
299. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
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the student's interest is classified as a liberty or property interest, it is clear

that when a university seeks to suspend or expel a student, the university

jeopardizes protected interests of the student.3 "° Thus, because a student's
liberty or property interests are implicated when a state university seeks to
suspend or expel the student, the university may not act without complying
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.30 '

Once a state university implicates interests that trigger the application of

the Due Process Clause, the question remains as to how much process the
Constitution requires the university to afford the student." 2 At the heart of
due process lies the key, central concept of our system of jurisprudence -

fairness - procedural fairness. 33 At a minimum, due process requires a
university to afford the student notice and an opportunity to be heard before

(stating that to have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the benefit); Gaspar v. Brton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that
student held protected property interest in receiving her education because she paid a separate
fee to attend vocational school); Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that payment of tuition to state university secures an entitlement to receiving the
educational benefit, thus qualifying as a protected property interest); discussion supra Part II.B
and accompanying notes.
300. See Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1 st Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
there is no question that a student's liberty and property interests are implicated when a
university seeks to suspend or expel a student); Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379,
1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983) ("It is undisputed that the threat of suspension or expulsion implicates
[a student's] property and liberty interests in public education and reputation...").
301. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (stating that due process
imposes constraints upon governmental decisions which implicate the liberty or property
interests of individuals).
302. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 577 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
303. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 207 (W.D. N.C. 1972). The Poe court notes the
ancient pedigree of due process:
Due process of law is not an American invention. It seems to have been
a trademark of civilization for thousands of years. By the age of Pericles
(5th Century B.C.), the concept of fair hearing seems to have been
accepted; the chorus in Aristophanes' legal satire, "The Wasps," chanted
that 'T'was a very acute and intelligent man, whoever it was, that
happened to say, Don't make up your mind till you've heard both sides.'
When the Apostle Paul was put on trial in the first century A.D. before
Festus, that Roman governor refused to proceed against him without a
hearing, reporting to King Agrippa that 'It was not the custom of the
Romans to give up anyone before the accused met the accusers face to
face and had an opportunity to make his defense concerning the charge
laid against him.' New Testament, Acts of the Apostles, Chapter 25,
Verse 16.
Id. See also Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496, n.25 (1959) (quoting the same passage from
the Bible to demonstrate the ancient concept of due process); Gorman,837 F.2d at 12 ("As early
as Magna Carta, procedure was regarded as a valuable means for the protection of the rights of
litigants.").
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expelling the student.' Yet, due process is not a static concept with a fixed,
3 5
rigid definition that does not account for the circumstances of each case. "
Rather, due process is a flexible concept, affording the procedural protections
The balancing test articulated in
that are necessary in each situation.'
Mathews takes account of the fact that different circumstances require
different procedures.3 7 Disciplinary proceedings which impose less serious
penalties on students, such as the loss of social privileges, may not require that
30
the student be represented by retained legal counsel. ' Nevertheless, when
the university seeks to suspend or expel a student the balance may shift in
favor of requiring such a procedure.3°
A. THE WEIGHT OF THE PRIVATE INTEREST AFFECTED BY SUSPENSION OR
EXPULSION

There is little disagreement among the courts that the weight of a
student's interest in receiving an education is substantial when a university
30
seeks to suspend or expel the student. " Dixon identified the affected interest
of the students as their right to remain at a university as students in good

304. See generallyMathews, 424 U.S. at 333; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). "The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer

grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citing Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice

Frankfurter later had this to say about the Due Process Clause: "[a]udi alteram partem - hear the
other side! - a demand made insistently through the centuries, is now a command, spoken with
the voice of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Gorman, 837 F.2d
at 12 (citing Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

305. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
306. Id. (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481).
307. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
308. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding that
weight of private interest of student faced with both disciplinary and criminal charges is
substantial); Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (applying
the Mathews balancing test and holding that private interest at stake is substantial); Gorman v.
University of R.I., 646 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. R.I. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 837 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1988) (concluding "threat of a one year suspension implicates a very substantial liberty
interest in an uninterrupted education."); French, 303 F. Supp. at 1337 (noting that suspension
or expulsion from institution of higher education jeopardizes an "extremely valuable right.");
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (stating,
"[w]hether the interest of the student be described as a right or a privilege, the fact remains [that
education] .. .is an interest of extremely great value and is deserving of constitutional
protection.").
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standing. 3" Yet there is more to it than that. Education is the foundation of
our society." 2 It is the "most important function of state... governments,"
and plays a central role in molding responsible citizens of our democratic
society.3" 3 Education exposes the student to the values of our society, prepares
the student to contribute to the growth of our civilization and trains the student
for the discharge of his civic responsibilities." 4 Because of the enormous
importance of education, both to the individual and to society at large, care
must be taken to protect the constitutional rights of students when a university
seeks to suspend or expel them, lest we "strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."3 5
Our society has changed drastically over the past few decades.
Advances in the sciences and technology have created a wealth of opportunities for those who have the skills necessary to exploit these new developments. When a university suspends or expels a student for disciplinary
reasons it very well may foreclose the future employment prospects of the
student.3 6 Under our system of government, citizens have a fundamental
right to engage in any of the common occupations of life,3" 7 and hold a liberty
interest in acquiring useful knowledge.3"' The right to engage in an occupation would be meaningless if the person does not have access to the information needed in order to develop the skills required for participation in that
occupation.319 A student, therefore, has a very substantial interest in pursuing
his education because the development and refinement of advanced skills is
necessary in order to meaningfully participate in our technologically complex
culture.320

311. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
312. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (Jackson,
J.); Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2132.
316. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157 (noting that students may not be able to earn an
adequate livelihood without a college education); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975)
(stating that suspension from high school could hinder the future employment prospects of
students); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (noting that "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.").
317. See United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 219 (1984).
318. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
319. See Marin v. University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D. P.R. 1974).
320. "It is trite, at the least, to say that obtention of a college degree in this Country has
gained tremendous stature and personal importance in the last twenty-five to fifty years."
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 754 (W.D. La. 1968).
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Another factor which enters into the weight of the student's interest is
his protected liberty interest in his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity." '' Disciplinary charges, in comparison to criminal charges, impose an
acute stigmatizing effect on the student. In the university setting, regulations,
analogous to laws prohibiting criminal conduct, often proscribe conduct which
322
is either criminal in nature or amounts to a common law intentional tort.
When disciplinary action is taken against the student for serious infractions
warranting suspension or expulsion, it is undeniable that these charges damage
the previous good name of the student and his reputation with his fellow
students and instructors. 2 3 Moreover, this stigma may follow the student for
the rest of his life.32 Initially, the student probably will not be admitted to
another university to complete his education.32 5 This is only the immediate
effect. Further into the future an employer may not wish to hire a student who
had previously been expelled from a university even if the student completes
32
his education and receives a degree from another university. Consequently,
not only is the student's reputation damaged, but he may carry an economic
wound for years to come. Thus, because of the importance of education in our
society and the stigmatizing effect suspension or expulsion has on the student,
the private interest affected when a university brings disciplinary action
against a student is substantial, if not tremendous.
B. THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS SUSPENSION OR EXPULSION AND THE VALUE OF
COUNSEL

Due process commands, and Dixon so held, that at a minimum, the
student be afforded notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to be

321.

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971).

322. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 101 (1st Cir. 1978) (student facing
criminal charges of assault with intent to rape also facing disciplinary action pursuant to
university regulations prohibiting the same conduct); JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 4, at 6
(allowing sanctions to be imposed by university for physical abuse, brawling, sexual abuse,
harassment and sexual harassment).
323. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975).
324. "It goes without saying, and needs no elaboration, that a record of expulsion from
high school constitutes a lifetime stigma." Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D. N.C.
1972) (quoting Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich.

1969)). There appears to be no reason why the same would not hold true for college students.
325.

See Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2138 nn.38, 40; supra notes 102-06 and

326.

See supra note 105 (noting that universities often note disciplinary problems on a

accompanying text; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961)
("It is most unlikely that a public college would accept a student expelled from another public
college of the same state.").
student's transcript).
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heard.327 Dixon did not require that students be afforded the right to
representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings,32 but "[t]he right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. '329 Due process should require that, in the context of
university disciplinary proceedings involving suspension or expulsion, the
student be represented by legal counsel regardless of whether the student faces
concomitant criminal charges. 3' ° This is so because "a charge of misconduct
... [depends] upon a collection of the facts•., easily colored by the point of

view of the witnesses. 33' In evaluating whether additional procedural
protections are required as aspects of due process in a particular instance, the
Mathews balancing test requires that the risk of the erroneous deprivation of
an interest and the value of additional procedural safeguards be evaluated in
the context of the procedures used at the hearing. 332 Most courts are of the
opinioh that the risk of a university erroneously suspending or expelling a
student when he is not represented by counsel is minimal given that the
student is afforded both notice of the charges against him and the opportunity
to present his version of the facts.333 Reasoning from the premise that
university students are educated and literate adults, courts also are of the

327. Dixon, 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961).
328. Id.
329. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). "What, then, does a hearing
include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the

right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right." Id. at

68. While Powell addressed the issue of whether persons facing the death penalty have the right
to counsel, a student should be afforded the same right when facing disciplinary suspension or
expulsion because of the gravity of the interest at stake. See Saurack, supra note 13, at 820-21.
330. But see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that due
process does not require right to counsel where disciplinary proceedings are noncriminal in
nature); Gorian v. University of R.I., 646 F. Supp. 799, 807 (D. R.I. 1986), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to require counsel at disciplinary proceeding
unless criminal charges are also pending). This part of the district court's ruling was affirmed
on appeal. See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16.
331. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158-59.
332. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Hart v. Ferris State
College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
333. See, e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221,226 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that risk of
error in disciplinary proceeding is trivial because university has no incentive to "jerry-rig"
proceedings against a student); Garshman v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 921
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that student is literate and educated person who can readily understand
proceedings against him without requiring the assistance of counsel); Jaksa v. Regents of the
Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (concluding that student did not
have right to counsel at disciplinary hearing because proceedings against student were not
unduly complex and student was not unguided through the procedural aspects of the hearing).
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opinion that students do not need trained legal assistance in presenting their
3
side of the matter.3" Nonetheless, this asserted rationale ignores reality.
When a student faces charges which carry the possibility of suspension
or expulsion, the student undoubtedly experiences an intense emotional
response.33 6 These emotional responses to the charges often evoke feelings of
fear and anger towards the process used to punish the student as well as
towards those who are advocating the university's interests at the
proceedings.133 As a result, the student often ineffectively articulates his side
338 In
of the story or his version of the facts in a coherent and logical manner.
contrast, those who are advocating the university's interests are detached and
disinterested, thus able to effectively and logically present the case against the
student to the decision-maker. 339 Furthermore, regardless of whether the
university proceeds through counsel or not, those presenting the university's
case are undoubtedly familiar with the procedures of the hearing.'
Consequently, the decision-maker is more likely to believe the university's
interpretation of the facts because it is presented in a more logically coherent
manner compared to a recitation of the facts by an involved and intensely
interested student."' Allowing the student to be represented by a studentadvocate simply does not provide adequate protection for the rights of the
accused student.342 Student representatives have neither the experience in
orally advocating a position with logical coherency nor are they trained to
think strategically about the future ramifications of choices made at the
hearing which could adversely affect the student's interests. Only trained
lawyers possess these skills.1 3 Without the representation of legal counsel,
the risk that a student could be erroneously suspended or expelled from a

334. See generally Garshman, 395 F. Supp. at 921; Jaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1252.
335. See Saurack, supra note 13, at 821.
336. Id.
337. See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 821 (citing James W. McMasters,
Comment, Mediation: New Processfor High School DisciplinaryExpulsions, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 736, 754 (1990)).

338. Id. The adage, "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is
particularly meaningful in this instance.
339. See Saurack, supra note 13, at 821.
340.
341.

Id.
See generally id.
Id. But cf. id. at 821 n.291 (noting that Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7,

342.
16 (1st Cir. 1988) states a contrary proposition); Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719
F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that student is allowed to be represented by "studentlawyers" in all crucial stages of the proceedings).
343. See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 821; Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d
100, 106 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that only a trained lawyer is capable of protecting the student's

future interests which could be adversely affected by his testimony at disciplinary hearing).
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university is large because the student, or his student-advocate, is unable to
meaningfully articulate his position and protect his future interests.'"
The value of allowing a student to be represented by counsel is obvious:
a lawyer can crystallize issues and present the student's case in a logical and
effective manner. Representation by counsel is essential in disciplinary
proceedings because trained lawyers are experienced in these quasi-legal
affairs.4 5 Because charges of misconduct depend upon the collection of facts
relating to the alleged misconduct,34 6 trained legal counsel "can help delineate
the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, . . . and
generally safeguard the interests of the [student]."347 If cross-examination is
permitted,"' only a trained lawyer has the experience necessary to engage in

344.

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69. There the Court states:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissable. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or
criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party
by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore,
of due process in the constitutional sense.
Id. But see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating,
"[we do] not imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses,
is required... [but] ...the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved...").
345. See generally French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969).
Disciplinary hearings are quasi-legal because "a charge of misconduct.., depends upon a
collection of the facts.., easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses." Dixon, 294 F.2d
at 158-59.
346. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158-59.
347. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). But see Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d
88, 98-101 (6th Cir. 1986) (vacating district court's decision which relied on Goldberg to hold
that student had the right to be represented by counsel at disciplinary hearing); Madera v. Board
of Educ. of N.Y., 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that "[t]he right to representation
by counsel is not an essential ingredient to a fair hearing in all types of proceedings.").
348. Courts are split on the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
students be allowed to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See generally Saurack, supra
note 13, at 797-98 (discussing cases dealing with confrontation and cross-examination); Swem,
supranote 15, at 376-77 (noting the decisions on the issue of whether students have the right
to cross-examine witnesses brought against them at a disciplinary proceeding).
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testing the truth of statements made by the university's witnesses.3 49 Above
all, an attorney is best qualified to prepare a student's defense to the charges,
plead that defense to the hearing board, and to guarantee that the student's
interests are protected. 350 A disciplinary hearing is, in essence, an adversarial
proceeding, and only trained legal counsel are capable of protecting the
student's interests during this hearing. Requiring that a student only be
allowed the assistance of counsel and not the representation of counsel does
not adequately protect the student's interests. The value of a lawyer is that
lawyers are skilled orators, capable of effectively protecting and advocating
a client's interests. Silencing the lawyer by limiting his role in disciplinary
proceedings to merely advising the student negates the very reason for having
a lawyer in the first place: to effectively advocate one's position and protect
one's interests.351
349. See Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(noting that the value of having cross-examination conducted by a lawyer is that the lawyer can
test the truth of statements in an efficient manner).
350. See generally French, 303 F. Supp. at 1337.
351. The interchange between Brendan Sullivan, attorney for Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North, and Senator Daniel Inouye during the Iran-Contra investigation aptly demonstrates this
point.
Objection. It's a hypothetical question. Pure
MR. SULUVAN:
speculation.
MR. LIMAN: You say that you were not sure whether the Attorney
General was conducting this inquiry at the request of the President or at
the request of the admiral. That's what I heard you say.
MR. NORTH: No. What I said was, I don't know that the admiral told me
on the 21st that the President, at least I don't recall knowing at the time
that the admiral told me that this was being done at the request of the
President. He may well have told me that.
MR. LIMAN: Would you have shredded less documents on the 22nd if
you had been told that the Attorney General was acting at the specific
request of the President, your Commander in Chief?
MR. Suu.JvAN: Objection.
CHAIRMAN INOUYE: What is the basis of your objection?
MR. SUInVAN: It is pure speculation. Dreamland. It has two "ifs" in it,
and Mr. Liman knows better than most, that those kinds of questions, Mr.
Chairman, are wholly inappropriate not just because of rules of evidence,
not because you couldn't say it in a court, but because it's just dreamland.
It is speculation. He says if you had done this and if you had done that,
what about this? Come on, let's have, Mr. Chairman, plain fairness.
Plain fairness, that's all we are asking for.
CHAIRMAN INOUYE: May I speak?
MR. SUVAN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN INOUYE: I'm certain counsel realizes this is not a court of law.
MR. SuujvAN: Believe me, I know that.
CHAIRMAN INOUYE: I'm certain you realize the rules of evidence do not
apply in this inquiry.
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The risk that an involved and intensely interested student will be
erroneously suspended or expelled when the student acts without the

representation of trained legal counsel is high. In university disciplinary
proceedings, the normal rules of evidence, applicable in civil and criminal
trials, do not apply. 52 While universities bear the burden of proving the

student's guilt by clear and convincing evidence,35 this standard of proof

simply does not afford adequate procedural safeguards to the student. A
student, acting without legal counsel, could be convicted by the ultimate trier
of fact because the student, or his student-advocate, simply is not prepared to
cope with the adversary nature of the disciplinary proceeding. 54 Assuming
that cross-examination were permitted and the student were allowed to be
assisted by counsel,355 the decision-maker, faced with weighing the credibility
of an involved and intensely interested student against the credibility of a
detached and disinterested administrator, may erroneously suspend or expel
the student because the student would be unable to effectively articulate his

side of the story in a logical and coherent manner that would establish

credibility with the hearing board.3" 6 Ultimately, the student is forced to rely

MR. SULLIVAN: That I know as well. I'm just asking for fairness.
Fairness. I know the rules don't apply. I know the Congress doesn't
recognize attorney-client privilege, a husband-and-wife privilege, priestpenitent privilege. I know these things are all out the window. We rely
on just fairness, Mr. Chairman, fairness.
CHAIRMAN INOUYE: We have attempted to be as fair as we can. Let the
witness object if he wishes to.
MR. SU111VAN: I'm not a potted plant. I'm here as a lawyer. That's my
job.
JOINT HEARINGS OFTHE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION, TESTIMONY OF OUVER NORTH: BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT CoMm. ON SECRET MIUTARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN
OPPOSITION AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH
IRAN, 100th Cong., H. 961-34, at 262-63 (1987). The author would like to thank Professor
Charles Condon of the Northern Illinois University College of Law for recommending this
passage and for his help in finding the passage in the committee reports.
352. See Saurack, supra note 13, at 798-99 and cases cited therein; Swem, supra note
15, at 379-80 and cases cited therein.
353. Swem, supra note 15, at 379-80.
354. See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 821.
355. Because courts are split on the issue of whether due process mandates crossexamination and the assistance of counsel, if these procedures are afforded to the student during
the disciplinary hearing, it is usually a matter of administrative grace. See JUDICIALCODE, supra
note 4, at 5 (allowing the student to cross-examine witnesses and limiting the role of counsel
to serving in an advisory capacity); supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text.
356. See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 821. A student, filled with the emotion
which the situation evokes, may be unable to effectively communicate his position even if
assisted by counsel. "Rehearsed answers or the opportunity to appeal mean little if the student
inadvertently makes mistakes at the hearing." Id.
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on the proposition that he is being afforded a fair hearing, but the decision as
to whether or not to suspend or expel the student could be affected by the
student's inability to effectively convey his story in an effort to rebut facts
propounded by other witnesses."' The value of legal counsel is significant in
that the lawyer can logically and effectively articulate the student's case in a
manner that establishes credibility with the decision-maker. Additionally, the
lawyer is able to effectively test the veracity of testimony offered at the
hearing. Thus, the value of affording the student the right to be represented
by counsel is the diminution of the risk of an erroneous suspension or
expulsion based on colored testimony."'
C.

THE BURDEN ON THE UNIVERSITY

In holding that state universities must comply with the requirements of
the Due Process Clause in disciplinary proceedings against a student, the
Dixon court was careful to state that the hearing afforded to the student need
not be a "full-dress judicial hearing .

. . ."

s

Fearful of imposing the

357. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,159 (5th Cir. 1961)
(requiring a hearing because the testimony of witnesses could be colored by their point of view).
With regards to fairness, the comments of Brendan Sullivan, in regard to Congressional
hearings, are analogous to university disciplinary hearings. See supra note 351.
358. Interestingly, high school students facing suspension or expulsion are afforded the
right to representation by counsel with counsel being allowed to cross-examine witnesses. See
Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing the Esteban
and Goldberg decisions in holding that due process requires the right to be represented by
counsel during high school suspension hearings); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.
N.C. 1972) (holding that high school students have the right to be represented by counsel
though not at public expense and citing the Dixon and Esteban decisions). But see Madera v.
Board of Educ. of N.Y., 386 F.2d 778, 785-89 (2d Cir. 1967) (concluding that suspended high
school student did not have the right to have counsel present at suspension conference); Osteen
v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (noting that Black Coalition requires
the right to representation by counsel but questioning its continuing authority). The rationale
of the cases holding that high school students be afforded the right to representation by counsel
is not entirely clear except for the fact that the courts generally state that where the suspension
is for a considerable period of time, due process requires a hearing incorporating these
procedures. Givens, 346 F. Supp. at 209; Black Coalition, 484 F.2d at 1045. When college
students are suspended, it is usually for a period of at least one semester, and expulsion is
generally considered to be permanent, though some universities limit the maximum amount of
time a student may be suspended or expelled. See JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 4, at 11 (stating
that suspensions can range from one to three semesters and expulsions are to be for a period of
two to four years). In any event, if high school students are afforded the right to be represented
by counsel as a requirement of due process, one must wonder why college students are not
afforded such a right. Both a high school and collegiate education are necessary in today's
society, and no sound reason appears to require distinguishing between the two situations.
359. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159. See also Wright, supra note 223, at 1031-32. Yet the
Dixon court also stated, "[n]evertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be
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courtroom atmosphere on universities, the Supreme Court in Horowitz stated,
"[a] school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative
hearing room.""'3 ' In the high school disciplinary context of Goss, the
Supreme Court also noted that to further judicialize the hearing procedures
would not only place costs on academic institutions which they may not be
able to bear, but would also negate the effectiveness of discipline as a function
of the educational process.36 ' When applying the final Mathews factor to
determine whether due process requires that a student be permitted representation by retained legal counsel at university disciplinary proceedings, most
courts hold that a requirement of such a procedure would place significant
burdens on the university.362 Echoing the concerns raised in Dixon, Goss, and
Horowitz, most courts reason that universities would face significant burdens
because allowing the student to be represented by counsel would force the
hearing further into an adversary mode, extend the time expended at the
hearings as a result of legal tactics employed by the students' attorneys, and
increase the expenses of universities by compelling them to retain their own
legal counsel to press the universities' interests.363
preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college." 294 F.2d at 159.
360. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88 (1978).
Horowitz, however, involved the academic dismissal of a student, not a disciplinary dismissal.
See supra notes 77-79, 144-46 and accompanying text.
361. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
To impose... even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost
more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary
tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.
Id. The Court, however, limited its holding to short suspensions often days or less. Id. at 584.
"Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures." Id.
362. See, e.g., Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (noting that allowing a student to be represented
by counsel would increase costs to the university); Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp.
1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that if the student were permitted to be represented by
counsel the university's costs would be increased because it would want to have legal counsel
present at the hearing); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1969) (opining,
in dictum, that requiring appointed legal counsel would increase costs to the university).
363. See, e.g., Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (recognizing that allowing a student to be
represented by counsel would further force the disciplinary hearing into an adversary hearing);
Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that some procedural
requirements impose burdens on state universities that outweigh their value to the student);
Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 146 (N.D. N.Y. 1997) (observing that student wanted to
be represented by counsel in order to prevail at disciplinary hearing and not to protect his
constitutional rights); Hart, 557 F. Supp. at 1388 (allowing student to be represented by
counsel would lengthen the hearing and require the university to have counsel present at the
hearing to protect the university's witnesses); Richmond, supra note 12, at 290 (stating that
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While courts may characterize the burdens placed on universities as

substantial, in actuality the burdens are minimal. First, it is not necessary that

universities hire lawyers to represent their interests during the disciplinary
hearing.3" Universities will already have hired administrators to operate their
disciplinary system, and these persons are very familiar with the procedures
used at the hearings. 365 These administrators have experience in orally
advocating a position comparable to that of a trained lawyer.3 6 Universities,
therefore, would not be forced to hire their own attorneys to represent their
interests. Second, universities would not bear any cost in allowing a student
to be represented by retained legal counsel because the student would be
responsible for the costs of his attorney.367 Finally, requiring that a student be
represented by retained legal counsel actually reduces the costs universities
bear in defending against student lawsuits alleging a denial of due process of
law. 36' Thus, far from greatly increasing the costs to universities, allowing
students to retain their own counsel to represent them actually decreases the
costs universities bear when the expenses of defending against student claims
are factored into the economic equation.369
Fears that allowing students to be represented by counsel would further
judicialize the disciplinary proceedings are similarly misplaced. 3 0 Allowing

university administrators are concerned that lawyers would engage in legal technicalities and
"chicanery" at disciplinary hearings). Cf. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100,106 (1st Cir.
1978) (noting that student only wanted counsel at disciplinary hearing to serve in advisory
capacity to protect his rights at later criminal trial and not to affect the outcome of the hearing).
364. But cf Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225-26. Judge Posner, employing an economic analysis,
voiced concerns that a university would want to hire its own lawyer to prosecute cases thereby
increasing the complexity of the proceedings and the costs that a university would incur in
disciplining students. Id.
365. See generally Saurack, supra note 13, at 821 (noting that universities will have
experienced and articulate adults representing their case who are familiar with the procedures
of the hearing).
366.

See generally id. at 822.

367. See generallyFrench v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1969). The
French court carefully limited its holding to allowing the students to be represented by retained
legal counsel because the student bears the expense of his own attorney. See id. Requiring a
university to appoint legal counsel for the student would undoubtedly place great financial
burdens on a university. See generally id. This article takes note of that fact by arguing only
that should a student desire to retain his own legal counsel, that is a procedure which he should
not be denied.
368. See generally Richmond, supra note 12, at 311.
369. The cost of defending against student lawsuits was one factor which did not enter
into Judge Posner's economic analysis in Osteen. See 13 F.3d at 225-26.
370. Judicial reluctance to impose trial-type procedures on university disciplinary
hearings is based on the notion that academic institutions must be free to operate without
governmental and judicial intervention. See id.; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (noting
that courts should exercise restraint in imposing procedures on public schools). While this
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a student to be represented by counsel would neither necessitate that the
hearing procedures become more complex nor would a lawyer's participation
in the hearing increase the time spent holding the hearing.3"7' The hearing
procedures, if promulgated by a state-supported university, would amount to
state law.3" Courts could consider the procedures outlined by the university
as a form of civil procedure applicable to the disciplinary proceedings. The
hearing procedures outlined by the university would thus prevent the hearing
from taking on a more trial-like atmosphere. These procedures could limit, to
a reasonable degree, the amount of time spent holding the hearings. A lawyer
rationale is credible, state universities must still respect the constitutional rights of students and
judicial intervention may be necessary in order to insure that the procedures employed by a
university in suspending or expelling a student do not allow the decision-maker to arbitrarily
suspend or expel the student. See generally Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating that the power of universities to expel students "is not
unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.").
371. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 363 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In Walters, the Supreme Court was faced with a situation analogous
to that faced by courts dealing with the right to representation by counsel in university judicial
proceedings. A federal statute limited to ten dollars the fee that a party could pay an attorney
to represent him before the Veterans Administration when seeking to collect benefits as a result
of armed service related disabilities. Id. at 307. Veterans groups challenged the statute on the
ground that it precluded them from effectively securing counsel to represent them before the
Veterans Administration and thus amounted to a denial of due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 308. Applying the Mathews balancing test, the Supreme Court concluded
that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 319-35. Of particular relevance here, the Court
concluded that allowing veterans to be represented by counsel without the fee limitation would
place a substantial burden on the government. Id. at 326. Voicing almost the same concerns
as those voiced by courts evaluating the right to representation by counsel in university judicial
proceedings, the Court found that introducing counsel into the administrative hearing used to
determine benefits would force the proceedings to take on a trial-like atmosphere. Id. at 323-25.
The Court reasoned that allowing the claimants to be represented by counsel retained for a fee
higher than ten dollars would complicate the proceedings because the government would want
to employ its own lawyers thereby frustrating Congress' goal of keeping the procedures as
informal and nonadversarial as possible. Id. at 323-26. Additionally, the Court found that the
record on appeal did not show that the veterans faced a serious risk of being erroneously
deprived of benefits without the aid of representation by counsel. Id. at 327. After weighing
the proper factors, the Court concluded that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 334-35.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the perceived costs which the government would
incur by allowing these veterans to be represented by counsel amounted to nothing more than
a "red herring." Id. at 362-63. Justice Stevens stated that, "[tihe complexity of the agency
procedures can be regulated by limiting the number of hearings, the time for argument, the
length of written submissions, and in other ways, but there is no reason to believe that the
agency's cost of administration will be increased because a claimant is represented by counsel
instead of appearing pro se." Id. Judge Posner, writing for the court in Osteen, stated that after
Walters, "the scope of the due process right to counsel seems excruciatingly narrow." Osteen,
13'F.3d at 226.
372. See generally Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (stating that student judicial code, which
outlines procedures to be followed at disciplinary hearings, is to be treated as state law).
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representing the student would thus be confined from engaging in conduct
373
which would further judicialize or lengthen the time of the hearing.
Requiring that students facing disciplinary suspension or expulsion be
represented by retained legal counsel would not further force disciplinary
hearings into a form of adversary litigation any more than that which already
exists as a result of procedures promulgated by universities. 3", Adequate

373. Additionally, rules regarding the professional conduct of lawyers would operate to
further prevent a lawyer from acting in such a way as to increase the complexity of the hearing.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.2 (1995). Rule 3.1 provides:
Meritorious Claims and Contentions. A lawyer shall not bring or defend
a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A
lawyer for a defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a
proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
Id. Comment 1 to Rule 3.1 further states that a lawyer has a duty not to abuse legal procedure.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 1 (1995). Comment 1 provides:
The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of
the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law,
both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an
advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never
is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy,
account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.
Id. Rule 3.2 requires that a lawyer proceed in a matter so as not to unduly lengthen the
proceedings. Rule 3.2 states: "Expediting Litigation. A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1995). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.2 cmt. 1 (1995). Comment I to Rule 3.2 provides:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the
advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt
to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar
conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether
a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action
as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial
or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a
legitimate interest of the client.
Id.
374. But see Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (allowing counsel to represent a student would
transform proceedings into the "mold of adversary litigation"); Hart v. Ferris State College, 557
F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that allowing representation by counsel would
escalate disciplinary hearing to that of a traditional trial). See also Walters, 473 U.S. at 323-27.
In upholding the constitutionality of the fee limitation against the veterans' due process
challenges, the Court concluded that allowing the veterans to be represented by retained counsel
would place a substantial burden on the government. Id. With regard to the substantial burden
that would be placed on the government, the Court reasoned that introducing lawyers into the
proceedings would further force those proceedings into an adversary mode. Id. In regard to
lawyers, the Court stated:
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procedural safeguards exist which not only would limit an attorney's conduct
at the hearing but would also prevent the hearings from becoming full-blown
criminal trials. Only if one categorically views all lawyers as unethical would
the fears of judicializing the disciplinary proceedings be substantiated.375

Furthermore, costs are diminished in that universities do not necessarily have

to hire their own attorneys and they actually save money because they would
no longer have to expend funds defending against student lawsuits. Thus, the
burden on the university is, in actuality, minimal.
D.

TILTING THE BALANCE

In Goss, the Court, in dictum, stated that suspensions or expulsions for

long periods of time may require more procedural protections than just notice

and an opportunity to be heard.376 The Court has never stated just what
additional procedures need be afforded to students faced with disciplinary
suspensions or expulsions which, in the university context, are for long
periods of time.377 Due process may not require that every conceivable
procedural protection be afforded to a student to avert any possibility of error
in a disciplinary hearing,378 but it does guarantee that the procedures afforded

Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the
truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means.
Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing
confusion not only are his right but may be his duty. The appearance of
counsel for the citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one - or
at least to cause the government's representative to act like one. The
result may be to turn what might have been a short conference leading to
an amicable result into a protracted controversy.
Id. at 325 (citing Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1287-90 (1975)).
The Court, in comparison to other courts ruling on a student's right to be represented by
counsel, concluded that injecting a lawyer into the benefits hearings would render the hearings
more adversarial and complex. Id. at 326.
375. See Waiters,473 U.S. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Responding to the Court's
reasoning that allowing veterans to be represented by counsel would force the benefits hearings
into the mold of an adversary proceeding, Justice Stevens stated:
[Tlhere is no reason to assume that lawyers would add confusion rather
clarity to the proceedings. As a profession, lawyers are skilled
communicators dedicated to the service of their clients. Only if it is
assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or unscrupulous can one*
rationally conclude that the efficiency of the agency's work would be
undermined by allowing counsel to participate whenever a veteran is
willing to pay for his services. I categorically reject any such assumption.
Id. The same reasoning applies to university disciplinary proceedings which are analogous to
the veterans' benefits hearings.
376. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
377. See supra note 358.
378. "In defining the process necessary to ensure 'fundamental fairness' we have
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to him will be fair.379 Simply affording the student a hearing on the charges
before him is not fair because the student and his student-advocate are not
38 ° When a
experienced in conducting themselves in these quasi-legal affairs.
university brings disciplinary action against a student seeking to suspend or
expel him, it is undeniable that the weight of the private interest implicated is
substantial. Additionally, without the aid of trained legal counsel, the risk that
a student will be erroneously suspended or expelled is large because he is
unable to adequately communicate his position. Allowing a student to be
represented by counsel insures that his position is effectively communicated
to the decision-maker and that his future interests are adequately protected.
Finally, adequate procedural protections are available which minimize any
burdens universities might bear in allowing students to be represented by
trained legal counsel.
Weighing the Mathews factors, the balance weighs heavily in favor of
requiring the student to be represented by retained counsel as an element of
the process which the student is constitutionally entitled to receive. The
interest of the student in his education is substantial, and, when combined with
the large risk that a student faces of being erroneously suspended or expelled
without the aid of retained counsel, the balance weighs mightily in favor of
requiring representation by counsel. The minimal burden that such a
procedure would place on the administration of university discipline simply
does not outweigh the substantial interests of the student. As such, in
instances where a student faces the possibility of suspension or expulsion
arising out of disciplinary action taken by a university, due process requires
that the student be represented by retained legal counsel. To hold otherwise
amounts to a denial of students' rights to due process of law.
CONCLUSION
When a university seeks to suspend or expel a student for misconduct,
it is engaging in a course of conduct which has tremendous consequences for
the student. Over the past few decades, our society has witnessed revolutionary advances which, while making life easier, have also increased its
complexity. Higher education is no longer regarded as a luxury. Rather, in

recognized that the Clause does not require that 'the procedures used to guard against an
erroneous deprivation ... be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error ...
Waiters, 473 U.S. at 320 (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)).
379. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 207 (W.D. N.C. 1972).
380. See generallySaurack, supra note 13, at 820-23; Picozzi, supra note 14, at 2155-61
(outlining procedures which should be employed to insure fairness at disciplinary hearings).
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today's society, a college education is a necessity in order to survive and
compete in our technologically sophisticated community. Suspension or
expulsion from a university not only deprives a student of the knowledge
necessary to contribute to the growth and development of our nation, but also
imposes an acute stigmatizing effect which the student may carry for the rest
of his life. Thus, suspension or expulsion from a university jeopardizes the
immeasurably important interest a student has in receiving an education.
With the undeniable importance of education to the individual and to
society at large, it is shocking to find that students, faced with losing what has
been described as the foundation of society, are not afforded the right to be
represented by retained legal counsel. Given the importance of the interest at
stake and the existence of procedural safeguards which would reduce any
burden placed on a university, the right to representation by retained counsel
should be required as an element of due process in university disciplinary
proceedings. One must wonder why universities are so staunchly against
affording students such a procedure and why courts are willing to acquiesce
in denying students this effective tool in safeguarding their interests. Current
precedent may be against the right to representation by retained counsel at
disciplinary hearings, but the times have changed, and fortunately, so too does
the law.
ROBERT B. GROHOLSKI

